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Bad Science Makes Bad Law: 
How the Deference Afforded to Psychiatry 
Undermines Civil Liberties 
Samantha Godwin 
ABSTRACT 
Courts and lawmakers trust psychiatric expertise when making judicial 
and public policy decisions concerning mental health, but is this trust well 
placed? This paper adopts a philosophy of science approach informed by 
medical research to evaluate the validity of psychiatric classification. This 
approach provides the basis for an interdisciplinary critical analysis of civil 
commitment law and use of psychiatric expert witnesses in light of legal 
evidence standards. This analysis demonstrates that involuntary civil 
commitment as it now stands is incompatible with broader due process and 
civil rights concerns and affords an unjustifiable evidentiary status to 
psychiatric diagnosis. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers psychiatric diagnoses, the psychiatric profession, 
and the roles they play in the legal system. Judges and juries rely on 
psychiatric expert testimony to provide factual information when cases deal 
                                                            
 Research Fellow, Georgetown University Law Center, JD, Georgetown University Law 
Center, MA and BA in Philosophy, University College London. This paper was presented 
at the Socio-Legal Studies Association 21st Annual Conference, April 12–14, 2011, at 
the University of Sussex in Brighton, United Kingdom. A version of Part 1 of this paper 
was previously presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and 
Psychology, June 12–14, 2009, at Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana and the 
21st Annual Meeting of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy & 
Psychiatry, May 17, 2009, in San Francisco, California. I am grateful to Peter Gabel, 
Gary Peller, and Heathcote Wales for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, 
and for the editorial assistance from the editors of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice. 
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with mental health.1 Legislators draft civil commitment statutes with the 
understanding that mental illness is a material phenomenon that actually 
exists in the world and not only in the beliefs of psychiatrists and the public. 
In the first part of this article, I challenge the assumption that psychiatry 
provides reliable and scientific facts by demonstrating that the evidence 
available to psychiatrists is typically insufficient to support many of the 
claims they make about mental illness. In summary, psychiatry lacks 
reliability as a science because psychiatry’s methodological approach to its 
own diagnostic criteria is not empirically meaningful; it categorizes mental 
illness in an arbitrary rather than scientifically valid way; and its theories 
are frequently unfalsifiable. 
Having built a theoretical case against the scientific reliability of 
psychiatric diagnoses, in the second part of this paper, I critique courts’ 
reliance on psychiatrists and psychiatry in establishing the facts of cases 
dealing with mental health. First, I demonstrate the jurisprudential 
inconsistency of granting psychiatric expert witnesses and diagnoses 
evidentiary status. Second, I critically evaluate the legal and philosophical 
bases for the involuntary civil commitment system through a close analysis 
of key case history in light of the problems with psychiatric evidence. In 
conclusion, I argue for radical reforms in mental health law that preserve 
constitutional guarantees of due process, rather than allow courts to be 
wowed by the pseudoscience of psychiatry. 
II. PART ONE: PSYCHIATRY IS INSUFFICIENTLY SCIENTIFIC 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained 
by calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that 
of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. . . . [I]n psychology, 
there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. . . . The 
existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
                                                            
1 For an example of the role of psychiatric expert testimony in civil commitment 
proceedings, see Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Modern Status as to Standard of Proof 
Required in Civil Commitment, 97 A.L.R.3d 780 (1980). 
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means of solving the problems which trouble us; though the 
problem and method pass one another by.2 
In any science, one of the fundamental questions of method is how 
scientists arrive at their theoretical conclusions from the observable data 
they have to work with. Such questions might include whether the 
conclusions are logically inferred from the data, whether the veracity of the 
theory depends only on the accuracy of the data, or whether the alternative 
hypotheses fit the data with equal logical plausibility. 
When considering these questions as they apply to psychotherapy, it is 
necessary to consider the scope of the claims being made and the scope of 
the data being used. The data psychiatrists work with is very limited. 
Authoritative research has not conclusively demonstrated any specific 
biological causes for mental disorders. Furthermore, there are no biological 
markers for mental disorders, nor are there any laboratory tests to diagnoses 
mental illness.3  Psychotherapeutic treatments, such as psychoanalysis and 
                                                            
2 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 232 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., Blackwell Publishers 2d ed. 1997). 
3 See U.S. CONG. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BA-538, THE BIOLOGY OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 13–14 (1992), available at http://www.fas.org/ota/reports/9237.pdf 
[hereinafter OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT] “Many questions remain about the biology of 
mental disorders. In fact, research has yet to identify specific biological causes for any of 
these disorders.” Id. at 13–14. “Mental disorders are classified on the basis of symptoms 
because there are as yet no biological markers or laboratory tests for them. Such 
groupings, therefore, may not be completely valid—similar symptoms may result from a 
variety of causes.” Id. at 46–47. Psychiatrist Allen Frances, chair of the APA DSM-IV 
Task Force and Professor Emeritus at Duke University, describes the issue as follows: 
Simply stated, descriptive psychiatric diagnosis does not now need and cannot 
support a paradigm shift. There can be no dramatic improvements in 
psychiatric diagnosis until we make a fundamental leap in our understanding 
of what causes mental disorders. The incredible recent advances in 
neuroscience, molecular biology, and brain imaging that have taught us so 
much about normal brain functioning are still not relevant to the clinical 
practicalities of everyday psychiatric diagnosis. The clearest evidence 
supporting this disappointing fact is that not even 1 biological test is ready for 
inclusion in the criteria sets for DSM-V. Fortunately, the NIMH is now 
embarked on a fascinating effort to effect the real paradigm shift of basing 
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psychopharmacological drugs, often appear to provide relief from 
disturbing psychological phenomena. However, the mechanism by which 
psychotherapeutic treatments result in symptom relief cannot be 
examined. That is, the relationship between the therapies and the 
symptom’s underlying etiology is unobservable.4  
The central issue is the extent to which the observable data of symptom 
relief provide verification for theories concerning the unobservable causes 
of those symptoms. To use an analogy, it is a little like the experience of 
smacking the side of a television to fix a fuzzy picture: if you know how to 
fix something, but you are not able to conclusively determine how you got 
it to work, then knowing how to fix it provides only a limited insight into 
why it broke. 
There is an epistemological dilemma posed by the gap between the 
subject matter investigated by psychotherapists and observable 
psychological phenomena. Clinical psychologists and psychiatrists have 
developed elaborate theories to explain the behavior of individual patients 
and categories of patients, but their principal method of testing those 
theories experimentally is by way of psychiatrists’ and psychotherapists’ 
                                                                                                                              
diagnosis on biological findings. Unfortunately, this is years (if not decades) 
from fruition. 
Allen Frances, A Warning Sign on the Road to DSM-V: Beware of its Unintended 
Consequences, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Aug. 2009, at 1, 4 (emphasis added). Professor 
Frances went on to explain that psychiatric diagnosis is currently “stuck at [a] descriptive 
level” without a “fundamental and explanatory understanding of causality.” Id. 
4 E.g., ELLIOT S. VALENSTEIN, BLAMING THE BRAIN 96 (1996). 
The explanations of how psychotherapeutic drugs help to alleviate mental 
disorders rarely go beyond stating what chemical changes the drugs 
induce. The psychiatric literature rarely address how or why an excess or 
deficiency in serotonin or dopamine activity explains any particular 
mental disorder. There are few serious attempts to bridge the huge gap 
between neurochemistry and the psychological phenomena that must 
ultimately be explained. 
Id. 
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abilities to alter the behavior or experience through treatment.5 Although it 
is often claimed that the manner in which the symptoms respond to 
treatment, whether through drugs or psychoanalysis, is heuristically 
meaningful to the cause of the symptoms,6 this can only be plausible if one 
accepts the initial premise that the treatment works in the way the 
psychologist or psychiatrist believes it works. 
The types of tests that clinical psychological hypotheses rely on are 
methodologically circular because they require that data be interpreted 
according to assumptions that hold true only if the hypothesis is, in fact, 
correct.  
Therefore, these hypotheses cannot be verified empirically, because the 
probative value of the evidence offered in their support depends on the truth 
of the hypotheses being tested. The scientific status of all hypotheses of this 
sort is questionable regardless of the volume of data collected to support 
them. While physicians confirmed to a very high degree of probability a 
hypothesis that syphilis can cause dementia7 by confirming syphilis in blood 
samples and charting its progression through physical observation, 
psychiatrists do not employ similar methods. As will be discussed more 
fully in Part One, specific “mental illnesses,” by contrast to known 
neurological diseases, cannot be confirmed with similar scientifically 
meaningful measurements. Although it is true that verification of medical 
hypotheses can only be certain to an unknown degree of probability, data 
                                                            
5 For a discussion of experimental testing of theories with regard to depression, see e.g., 
Jeffrey R. Lacasse & Jonathan Leo, Serotonin and Depression: A Disconnect between the 
Advertisement and the Scientific Literature, 2 PLOS MED. 1211, 1211–15 (2005); 
Jonathan Leo & Jeffrey R. Lacasse, The Media and the Chemical Imbalance Theory of 
Depression, SOC’Y, Nov. 2008, at 35–45. 
6 See Lacasse & Leo, supra note 5, at 35. 
7 This example was suggested by Heathcote Wales, Professor of Law at Georgetown 
University Law Center, in comments made on an earlier draft of this paper. For a 
description of dementia as a symptom of syphilis, see Neurosyphilis, PUBMED HEALTH,  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001722/ (last reviewed Sept. 15, 
2010). 
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mobilized in support of psychiatric hypotheses cannot even achieve this. 
Provided one controls for confounding variables, coincidence, and reverse 
causation, the greater the percentage of dementia patients whose blood 
samples test positive for syphilis compared to a control group, the more 
likely syphilis is to be a possible cause of dementia. There is no equivalent 
in psychiatry. No matter how large a sample of delusional patients one has, 
this will never provide evidence that schizophrenia causes delusions 
because the presence of schizophrenia cannot be confirmed except through 
reference to the delusions and other symptoms themselves. For example, 
there are no physically based diagnostic tests for schizophrenia, it is only 
inferred from characteristics psychiatrists assume to be its symptoms.8 This 
will be explored more thoroughly in Part One. 
A. General Epistemological Problems for Theories of Mental Illness 
1. Adolf Grünbaum’s Critique of Psychoanalytic Therapy 
Adolf Grünbaum, a leading philosopher of science at the University of 
Pittsburg who studied psychoanalysis’s epistemological liabilities, offered 
one of the major critiques of psychoanalysis to come out of the analytic 
philosophy of science. In this section, I expand upon his critique in order to 
demonstrate how it could apply equally to psychiatry. In this way, I propose 
that the epistemological liabilities of psychoanalysis are not unique to 
psychoanalysis but are also found, in a form, in psychiatry, and therefore 
psychiatry’s claims to scientific validity must also be treated with great 
skepticism. 
Grünbaum recognized a source of epistemological problems in 
psychoanalysis: the psychoanalysts’ preferred means for verifying 
psychoanalytic hypotheses are found within the discipline and the theory 
                                                            
8 Albana M. Dassori, Alexander L. Miller & Delia Saldana, Schizophrenia Among 
Hispanics: Epidemiology, Phenomenology, Course, and Outcome, 21 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 303, 304 (1995) (“There was (and is) no test for schizophrenia that is independent 
of the phenomenological criteria.”).   
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itself. 9  Grünbaum wrote that “we have been told that the validation or 
discreditation of psychoanalytic hypotheses is vouchsafed by the 
investigatory value of the particular clinical techniques employed in the 
psychoanalytic interview”10 and cites Paul Meehl, former president of the 
American Psychological Association, as stating that “the best place to study 
[i.e., test] psychoanalysis is the psychoanalytic session itself.”11 Attempts to 
prove the validity of the psychoanalytic method by appeal to that method 
itself assumes the reliability of the method that one is trying to evaluate. 
This does not amount to a meaningful evaluation. 
Freud tried to address this concern by offering what Grünbaum termed 
the “Necessary Condition Thesis.”12 Grünbaum summarized the thesis as: 
“Only psychoanalytic interpretations that ‘tally with what is real’ in the 
patient can mediate veridical insight, and such insight, in turn, is causally 
necessary for the successful alleviation of his neurosis.”13 This thesis can be 
seen to suffer from the same circularity that is found in Meehl’s claim. 
One of Grünbaum’s most effective refutations of the Necessary 
Condition Thesis is that the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis could just 
as plausibly be attributed to a placebo effect rather than showing any 
relation between the psychoanalysis and what is real in the patient. 14 
                                                            
9 See Adolf Grünbaum, Epistemological Liabilities of the Clinical Appraisal of 
Psychoanalytic Theory, 14 NOÛS 307, 375 (1980) [hereinafter Epistemological 
Liabilities]. 
10 Id. at 310. 
11 Id. at 375. 
12 Id. at 321. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally id. Of course, psychoanalysts are not the only people who try to improve 
the mental well being of others. Grünbaum drew a parallel with evangelical Christians 
who use suggestion to produce profound personality changes in people who are “born 
again” in their religious faith. See id. at 308. One might presume that evangelicals likely 
use their own version of the “Necessary Condition Thesis,” believing that they could not 
have had those transformative religious experiences except as a result of a “personal 
relationship” with their God. See id. at 321. The positive transformation could therefore 
seem to verify the “truth” of their religion, but only for people who accept that this is in 
fact the mechanism responsible for the transformation.  See id. 
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Analytically, there is no clear way to know which of the explanations, true 
insight or placebo, would be more correct.15 Even if we could imagine a 
controlled experiment where the efficacy of a group of psychoanalysts was 
compared to the efficacy of a group of untrained people attempting talk 
therapy—if the psychoanalysts had superior results, this would not confirm 
that the superior results were a result of true insight and not some other 
difference in technique.16 
While Grünbaum’s target was specifically psychoanalysis, his thesis is 
indicative of a more general epistemological problem for theories informing 
psychotherapy and the treatments, classifications, and etiologies of mental 
disorders. 
2. Could Theoretical Explanations for a Patient’s Mental State Be 
Verified Externally? 
It might be possible to consider a thought experiment to exclude placebo 
effects. Imagine that a psychoanalyst offers a patient two sets of 
explanations for the patient’s psychological issues: a first “control” 
explanation that seems plausible but does not represent the genuine analysis 
and a second “test” explanation informed by the actual analysis of the origin 
of the patient’s condition. Even if the patient was to respond more 
positively to the test explanation than to the control explanation, the 
experiment would only provide evidence against a random placebo effect, 
not evidence in favor of the psychoanalyst’s test explanation. The patient 
may have reasons for wanting to believe the second explanation regardless 
of whether it is accurate. For example, simply providing a plausible 
narrative to frame a problem could provide relief. Or, a patient might find a 
therapist’s explanation sympathetic, and the experience of sympathy could 
have a therapeutic effect. Because we cannot observe what mechanism in 
the patient’s mind provided relief, and there are many plausible 
                                                            
15 See generally id. (discussing the epistemological limitation of psychoanalysis). 
16 See generally id. 
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mechanisms, the external response cannot constitute positive evidence of 
any one of them.17 
We could also assume that some hypotheses to explain a particular 
patient’s behavior might be ruled out by evidence external to the patient, so 
that there might be at least, in theory, a way to show that some psychiatric 
theories are more plausible than others. The ability to rule out some 
explanations does not, in and of itself, justify believing explanations that 
have yet to be ruled out. For example, consider a therapist who theorizes 
that her patient’s phobia is caused by either event A or event B. If, in 
reality, the patient did experience event A but not event B, then a theory 
contingent on event B can be ruled out. This does not mean, however, that 
the fact that event A occurred provides evidence that event A caused the 
patient’s phobia. The only reason to believe that event A is the cause of 
phobia is the theory itself, so it is circular to say that the fact of event A 
supports the therapist’s theory. Whether event A is viewed as necessary, 
contributory, or coincidental to phobia depends not on the presence or 
absence of event A, but whether one considers event A as meaningful to 
understanding the phobia. The fact that event A happened has only 
evidentiary value to the hypothesis that event A caused the phobia if the fact 
is interpreted with the assumption the hypothesis is true. So, while external 
facts about a patient may be sufficient to determine that some hypotheses 
are false, they are not sufficient to show that other hypotheses are likely 
true. 
If there was a large enough sample of patients with the same phobia, and 
enough of them experienced event A, it might be possible to build a case 
that event A could probably contribute to that type of phobia using an 
experimental methodology to minimize confounding variables. This would 
still, however, be insufficient to determine whether event A was a cause for 
the phobia in any individual patient since individual patients’ particular 
                                                            
17 However, it might be possible to rule some out. 
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phobias could have causes: statistically demonstrating that a certain variable 
probably causes a certain effect (absent unknown confounding variables) 
does not demonstrate that other variables would not also cause this effect in 
any given case. It also could not confirm any theory of how event A is 
responsible for phobias. More significantly for psychiatry, however, 
attributing “mental illnesses” themselves as causes for patient symptoms 
could not be similarly evidenced by observation or historical records for the 
simple reason that “mental illnesses” are defined by the symptoms 
themselves.18 
The disease or organic model of psychiatric mental illness might 
superficially appear to be more scientific than Freudian psychoanalytic 
claims, since psychiatry more uniformly positions itself as a medical 
discipline. However, this treatment model similarly posits theories of 
mental disturbances on an evidentiary basis dependent on assumptions 
contained within the hypothesis being tested: the treatment effects of 
psychiatric interventions on patient behavior only contribute evidence to 
support a proposed etiology if the relationship between cause and effect is 
in fact as it is according to the etiological theory. This is not a safe inference 
because the issue in question when diagnosing a patient is precisely what 
the cause or causes of the complaint or aberrant behavior are. When trying 
to determine a cause and effect relationship, an alleged effect only has 
evidentiary status in suggesting the presence of its alleged cause if the 
relationship between cause and effect accords with the theory. The 
theoretical framework itself, as will be described in greater detail in the 
following sections, lacks grounding in empirical observation, unlike other 
fields in science and medicine. As a result, the symptoms do not, in and of 
themselves, provide evidence to support the general etiological theory, so 
hypotheses concerning the causes of mental disturbances in psychiatry 
                                                            
18 See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47. 
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suffer from similar problems of epistemological circularity as with 
psychoanalysis. 
3. Reliable Inferences About the Cause of a Mental State Cannot Be 
Made by Altering the Mental State 
Mental illnesses are popularly said to be caused by a “chemical 
imbalance in the brain,” which can be corrected by psychoactive drugs.19 
The fact that the psychoactive drugs (sometimes) relieve undesirable 
symptoms is thought to provide evidence that these imbalances exist to be 
corrected. 20  Both psychiatrists and laypersons frequently believe that if 
someone appears to be suffering from some kind of malfunction of the brain 
and raising the level of a certain chemical in the brain appears to improve its 
function, this implies that the chemical levels raised were previously 
deficient, even absent any laboratory tests to determine pre-treatment 
deficiency.21 To illustrate why inferences from altering a mental state do not 
help prove the cause of the original mental state, consider an example from 
Grünbaum: 
[P]henothiazenes [sic] turned out to be capable of inducing the 
negative side effect of parkinsonism, at least transiently (cf. 
Balkiston [8]: 1130). But the motor impairment manifested by 
parkinsonians is attributed to a deficiency of brain dopamine. 
Hence the unfavorable parkinsonian side effect of the 
phenothiazene [sic] drugs on schizophrenics amid the alleviation of 
psychotic symptoms produced by them turned out to have heuristic 
value as follows: Besides suggesting that these drugs block the 
dopamine receptors in the brain, it raised the possibility that an 
                                                            
19 The notion that chemical imbalances in the brain are the cause of mental illness is 
called the “monoaime hypothesis” in the literature. See STEPHEN M. STAHL, STAHL’S 
ESSENTIAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: NEUROSCIENTIFIC BASIS AND PRACTICAL 
APPLICATIONS 488–89, 521 (3d ed. 2008). There is no direct evidence of this, and 
attempts at direct verification of varieties of chemical imbalances in depression have 
failed and provided some evidence against the hypothesis in its basic form. See id. 
20 See Lacasse & Leo, supra note 5, at 1212. 
21 See id. 
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excess of dopamine might be implicated in, the aetiology of 
schizophrenia. In this way, a biochemical malfunction of the brain 
was envisioned quite specifically as causally relevant to this 
psychosis (cf. Kolata [43a]). 22 
Even if it is assumed that (1) parkinsonism has a single etiology rather 
than being a symptom with multiple causes, (2) parkinsonism is always 
caused by dopamine deficiency, and (3) phenothiazine reduces dopamine 
production or activation, it still would not follow from these three 
assumptions that there is a logical imperative for believing that 
phenothiazine reduces psychosis by the same mechanism through which it 
induces parkinsonism. 
Anti-psychotic drugs are known to have diverse side effect profiles.23 In 
fact, different anti-psychotic drugs prescribed to treat the same symptoms 
often result in different side effects.24 Since these drugs often have more 
than one neurological effect,25 the reduction in psychotic symptoms could 
be attributable to an entirely different neurological mechanism besides 
dopamine reduction. If phenothiazines exhibit at least two mechanisms, one 
of which causes a reduction in psychotic symptoms and the other of which 
induces parkinsonism, then even correctly identifying the cause of the 
parkinsonism would not shed light on the cause of the reduced psychosis, 
let alone the cause of the original psychosis. Putting all of those problems 
aside and, for the sake of evaluating the logic of the claim, adopting the 
additional assumption that it is in fact a reduction in the effect of dopamine 
that leads to relief from psychotic symptoms in schizophrenic patients 
                                                            
22 Grünbaum, supra note 9, at 328. 
23 See ROBERT J. WALDINGER, PSYCHIATRY FOR MEDICAL STUDENTS 529 (3d ed. 1997) 
(arguing that “[a]ll antipsychotics have side effects” and exhibiting a list of side effects). 
See also L. Voruganti et al., Comparative Evaluation of Conventional and Novel 
Antipsychotic Drugs with Reference to their Subjective Tolerability, Side-Effect Profile 
and Impact on Quality of Life, 43 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 135–45 (2000) (comparing and 
discussing side effects). 
24 See Voruganti, supra note 23. 
25 See id. 
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treated with phenothiazine, this still would not provide compelling evidence 
for asserting that schizophrenia is caused by a malfunction of the brain 
leading to excess dopamine. To assert such a claim would require 
knowledge of the specifics of the state of a schizophrenic’s brain prior to 
phenothiazine treatment. This is because the treatment only loosely suggests 
information about the brain in an altered post-phenothiazine administration 
state, and it is the prior state that is the subject of the theory. 
Attempting to infer causation from correlation produces “third variable 
problems” throughout medicine and science. 26  In other scientific fields, 
there are strategies to increase the probability of a causal relation, such as 
randomizing “controlled” variables to prevent a systematic relation between 
the controlled variable and the independent variable being tested. 27 
Psychiatric causal theories, however, would resist these approaches for a 
simple reason: it is only possible to reliably control for third variables when 
the variables are known.28 When it comes to the question of how mental 
states are formed, the variables are largely unknown.29 Not only do we not 
know all of the factors that might affect a person’s mind, we cannot 
determine the range of variables that might influence it. Typically, when 
                                                            
26 See JOHN PHILLIPS, HOW TO THINK ABOUT STATISTICS 59–60 (1973). For a longer 
explanation of correlation and causation, see DAVID MOORE, STATISTICS CONCEPTS AND 
CONTROVERSIES 208–20 (1985). 
27 See PHILLIPS, supra note 26, at 141. 
28 There are, however, attempts to control for unknown variables through randomization. 
See generally Mark Nickerson, The Control of Unknown Variables, 97 CAN. MED. 
ASSOC. J. 118–22 (1967) (discussing attempts to control for unknown variables in 
clinical pharmacology. However, questions can remain as to how random the sample 
actually is, or whether symmetrical relationships with unknown variables persist, as long 
as those variables are themselves unknown). 
29 See John Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication, 
Medication, and Explanation, 10 AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 470, 473 (1999); Howard 
Gardner, Scientific Psychology: Should We Bury it or Praise it?, 10 NEW IDEAS IN 
PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (1992); Peter Munz, The Phenomenon of Consciousness from a 
Popperian Perspective, in CONSCIOUSNESS TRANSITIONS: PHYLOGENETIC, 
ONTOGENETIC AND PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECTS 307–26 (Hans Liljenström & Peter Århem 
eds., 2008). 
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associations between two variables reoccur in various circumstances 
(reducing the chance that the correlation is due to a confounding variable), a 
plausible theory explains how one variable causes the other and, if no 
equally plausible confounding variable could explain the correlation, it is 
reasonable to think that a causal relationship exists. 30  However, the 
existence of an organic mental illness cannot be directly observed in order 
to correlate it with any other variable;31 rather, it is said to be implied by the 
symptoms themselves.32 Given this, we cannot establish correlation between 
an organic disorder that exists apart from its symptoms and the symptoms 
themselves, except with regard to disorders that can be verified through 
non-psychiatric medical means.33 
There are some basic flaws in trying to make inferences about the cause 
of an original state of mind from how that mind apparently changed after 
the introduction of a foreign substance such as a drug. To illustrate this, 
consider an analogous psychological thought experiment. If a patient 
presents with a mild case of “social phobia,” and a psychiatrist attempts to 
“treat” the case by administering a dose of alcohol to the “patient,” they 
would both likely find that relief from the symptoms would follow.34 In 
reality, the psychiatrist would probably not infer that the social phobia is 
caused by a biochemical malfunction of the brain resulting in a sub-normal 
blood alcohol level. However if the psychiatrist were to make such an 
inference, that inference would be structurally the same as the example with 
phenothiazine, dopamine, and schizophrenics. The ability to alter a state by 
                                                            
30 See MOORE, supra note 26, at 219. 
31 See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. The epistemic difficulties with psychiatric methodology may not apply to the 
methods of neurologists, but so far no definitive neurological markers have been found 
for any mental illnesses. If diagnostic laboratory tests were possible, however, these 
would not seem to constitute psychiatric tests but neurological tests, and this paper’s 
subject is not the concept of mental illness but rather psychiatric expertise. See id. 
34 Of course, some “patients” would not react this way—just as psychotropic medication 
typically produces a variety of patient responses. 
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introducing specific chemicals does not logically suggest that that those 
chemicals are informative about the nature of the original condition any 
more than a psychoanalyst’s ability to alter a patient’s emotional state by 
describing what he believes to be the patient’s unconscious motives is 
informative about what the genuine source of the patient’s original 
emotional state was. 
Moreover, because multiple mutually exclusive theories35 on the etiology 
of schizophrenia would be consistent with the fact that phenothiazine 
reduces psychosis in schizophrenics, the data cannot be said to scientifically 
verify any theory. Instead, psychiatrists can at best make a speculative case 
as to why phenothiazine might have such an effect. But given that any such 
case cannot be structured into a testable hypothesis, it cannot be construed 
meaningfully as scientific. 
The use of phenothiazines to treat schizophrenia offers a strong example 
of where the psychiatric profession was able to treat a condition with a drug 
in a way that seemed to confirm that they “got it right.” Other 
pharmaceutical interventions cast a less favorable light on psychiatry. To 
use a prime example, anti-depressants work only marginally better than 
placebos.36 Anti-depressants appear to work, but only because people tend 
to improve from depression whether they take real medication or sugar 
pills. 37  The marginal benefits may be attributed to a stronger placebo 
mechanism than that experienced by control groups. People who develop 
                                                            
35 See generally A. Furnham & P. Bower, A Comparison of Academic and Lay Theories 
of Schizophrenia, 161 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 201–10 (1992) (discussing the numerous 
theories of schizophrenia’s etiology). 
36 See Irving Kirsch & Guy Sapirstein, Listening to Prozac but Hearing Placebo: A 
Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medication, PREVENTION & TREATMENT, June 1998, at 
2a. 
37 See id; Joanna Moncrieff, The Antidepressant Debate, 180 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 
193–94 (2002); Sharon Begley, The Depressing News About Antidepressants, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Jan. 28, 2010, 7:00 PM),  
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/28/the-depressing-news-about-
antidepressants.html. 
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side effects tend to experience stronger placebo effects because the side 
effects confirm that they received the real drug rather than the placebo, 
causing an enhanced super-placebo effect.38 
B. Are Psychiatric Diagnoses Equivalent to Medical Diagnoses? 
Many would argue that even if psychiatry is not able to fully explain 
scientifically the etiologies of mental disorders, it remains scientifically 
valuable because it can identify coherent syndromes, describe diagnostic 
criteria for those syndromes, and make predictions about individuals’ 
prognoses and responses to treatment by studying the population 
experiencing these symptoms. This section challenges the widely-held 
belief that psychiatric diagnoses correspond to any scientifically 
ascertainable syndromes. While each new edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM) has increasingly shied away from describing 
most disorders explicitly in terms of hypothesized etiology,39 psychiatrists 
have continued to categorize clinical features according to unverifiable 
theoretical classifications rather than classifying patients according to the 
empirical data. 
1. Could Psychiatric Diagnoses Have a Physical Reality? 
Psychiatrists assert that particular symptoms are caused by, and are 
evidence of, specific mental illnesses, which can be diagnosed by 
evaluating a patient’s behavior and professed ideas. There is no doubt that 
psychiatric patients can exhibit unusual behavior, or that they report 
experiencing unusual thoughts, ideas, and sensations—and we might often 
reasonably infer that there must be something “wrong” with them. The 
question I wish to pose here is not whether diseases of the brain can occur 
the same way as diseases of the body, but whether psychiatrists offer 
scientifically testable reasons for thinking that the behavior and ideas 
                                                            
38 See Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 193 (using the term “amplified placebo effect”). 
39 See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46. 
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patients present are truly symptomatic of the specific illnesses that 
psychiatrists diagnose. The epistemological problem with psychiatric 
diagnoses is that the specific mental illnesses tends to be defined not by any 
scientifically testable underlying pathology or etiology, but by the 
symptoms themselves.40 This amounts to a basically circular definition, and 
a more detailed elaboration will be provided below. The question then 
becomes whether the diagnostic criteria actually provide evidence for 
specific mental illnesses or if the diagnostic criteria for mental illnesses are 
essentially invented categories artificially imposed on the data. Patient 
behavior, ideas, and experiences may be both real and organic in origin. 
This may be true without any indication that the specific psychiatric 
illnesses of which they are said to be symptoms have a somatic reality. 
To use an example, patients can be diagnosed as schizophrenic if they 
exhibit any two or more of a long list of varied and potentially unrelated 
symptoms (provided that they do so with sufficient duration, have sufficient 
social dysfunction, and do not meet certain exclusion criteria): 
 
(1) delusions 
(2) hallucinations 
(3) disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence) 
(4) grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior 
(5) negative symptoms, i.e., affective flattening, alogia, or avolition 
[Only one of the above] symptom[s] is required if delusions are 
bizarre or hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running 
commentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or more 
voices conversing with each other.41 
Imagine two groups: patients in group A have disorganized speech and an 
affective flattening but normal perceptions and ideas, and patients in group 
B have a bizarre delusion but typical speech and affect. Both A and B have 
                                                            
40 See id. at 47. 
41 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 312 (4th ed., text rev., 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]. 
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social or occupational dysfunction and have had their symptoms for at least 
one month. Additionally, nothing developmental, medical, or substance-
related explains the symptoms. According to the DSM classification, both A 
and B should be said to suffer from schizophrenia. Yet A and B have no 
symptoms in common and have totally different and seemingly unrelated 
presentations. In what way does it make sense to say that both groups suffer 
from the same mental illness? 
This is not a case where patients with the same clinical presentation are 
inferred to have the same syndrome due to their similarities. Instead, these 
patients would be thought to have a common illness despite their complete 
lack of similarities. The decision to classify A and B as suffering from the 
same mental disorder could not be explained by the observable phenomena 
of their clinical presentation but only by a theory about how those 
symptoms relate to an underlying cause. As described in the previous 
section, these theories cannot be empirically validated because the probative 
value of their data depends on the veracity of their theoretical conclusions. 
To extend this critique, imagine group C shares a belief that “a stranger 
has removed [their] internal organs and has replaced them with someone 
else’s organs without leaving any wounds or scars,”42 and, as a result of this 
belief, all members of group C have quit their jobs. Group D also shares this 
delusion, believing that a strangers have removed their internal organs and 
replaced them with someone else’s. However, while members of group D 
find this strange and disturbing, the delusion has not stopped them from 
showing up to work or socializing with their friends (and thus they do not 
meet Criteria B, an additional criteria, where to be diagnosed as 
schizophrenic a patient must both have symptoms as described above and 
substantial social dysfunction). Using the DSM IV-TR definition of 
schizophrenia, group C suffers from the same mental disorder as groups A 
and B—with whom it shares no common symptoms or experience—but 
                                                            
42 Id. at 299. 
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group D is excluded from the same diagnostic category. This exclusion is 
sanctioned despite the fact that C and D have precisely the same symptoms 
and presentation, and they differ only in how well or how poorly they cope 
with their afflictions (or, perhaps, differ only in random chance, in how well 
they like their job and/or friends, or in how socially acceptable their 
symptom is to people around them). At this point it becomes clear that the 
description of schizophrenia as a label could not have emerged organically 
merely from analyzing patient presentation and grouping a set of similarly 
presenting patients together; rather, the way the psychiatric profession 
groups patients together depends on the significance attributed to often 
disparate symptoms. 
In physical medicine, it is possible to suppose that two different 
modalities of presentation might be attributable to the same underlying 
condition, where some gold standard diagnostic test is positive in both 
presentations.43 However, because no such physical test exists44 or, for that 
matter, does any single unifying symptom or indicator demonstrate 
schizophrenia,45 no such inference can be drawn. Instead, schizophrenia’s 
diagnostic criteria seem to be an essentially arbitrary cluster of symptoms 
that would characterize totally disparate clinical presentations under the 
same label, while excluding from that label extremely similar 
presentations.46 Another feature of the DSM definition of schizophrenia that 
points to shoehorning symptoms into a preconceived invented category 
rather than inferring a category from symptoms. Namely, that symptoms 
vary according to demographics: schizophrenia supposedly occurs in one 
                                                            
43 Cf. M. Carrington Reid et al., Use of Methodological Standards in Diagnostic Test 
Research, 274 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 645, 646–49 (1995). 
44 See generally DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 299 (“No laboratory findings are 
diagnostic of Schizophrenia . . . .”). 
45 See id. at 305 (“No single symptom is pathognomonic of Schizophrenia . . . .”). 
46 Cf. id. at 303 (discussing a wide range of “sub-types”); id. at 310–11 (discussing 
distinctions made between schizophrenia and similar mental illnesses, some of which are 
simply made “by definition”). 
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pattern in men while presenting in a completely different pattern in women, 
with differing symptoms beginning at different age ranges.47 
Further, the supposed correlations between schizophrenia and the 
tendency to have larger or smaller neuroanatomical structures than a control 
group48 is of no help in establishing schizophrenia as a coherent, discrete 
disorder that exists independently of the DSM-IV-TR. This is because the 
sample of schizophrenia patients would have been selected according to the 
DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria, and the correlations could have been made 
stronger or weaker had a different diagnostic criteria set with a different 
constellation of symptoms been adopted. This, therefore, provides no reason 
to think that the set criteria actually used corresponds to any discrete 
condition existing in the world.49 
There is no reason to doubt that some people in reality fit the 
presentations of A, B, and C. In this sense, “schizophrenia” might be “real” 
in that there are people who would fit the description. But there is also no 
reason to think that A, B, and C have anything naturally, medically, or 
psychologically to do with each other, except insofar as the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) has arbitrarily decided to label them 
together. Schizophrenia, like all so-called mental illnesses, has never had a 
laboratory test, brain tissue abnormality, or other physical marker that can 
                                                            
47 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 307–08. 
48 See generally Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia, 
49 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1–52 (2001) (reviewing the literature of MRI findings). 
49 The APA hints at acknowledging this limitation in the DSM-IV-TR: 
The DSM-IV is a categorical classification that divides mental disorders 
into types based on criteria sets with defining features. . . . [T]here is no 
assumption that each category of mental disorder is a complete discrete 
entity with absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or 
from no mental disorder. . . . The clinician using DSM-IV should 
therefore consider that individuals sharing a diagnosis are likely to be 
heterogeneous even in regard to the defining features of the diagnosis and 
that boundary cases will be difficult to diagnose in any but a probabilistic 
fashion. 
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at xxxi. 
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identify it50 because it cannot be tested for or examined, and there is no way  
to confirm that the symptoms are symptomatic of a specific, discrete, 
underlying disorder. In this sense, no reason exists to believe that 
schizophrenia as a discrete and coherently conceptualized condition exists 
in the world in any meaningful way independent of the APA’s narrative 
about the symptoms that might trigger the classification. This is similarly 
true of any psychiatric diagnosis in that, while the symptoms may be 
empirically observable, there is no empirically-based reason to describe a 
list of symptoms as being one disorder or another disorder. 51  There is 
therefore no scientific basis for bridging the gap between a set of clinical 
symptoms and a diagnosis: the diagnosis is simply imposed on the 
symptoms.52 
                                                            
50 See U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., Overview of Mental Illness, in MENTAL HEALTH: A 
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL,  
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/chapter2/sec2.html (last visited Feb. 
20, 2012). “The diagnosis of mental disorders is often believed to be more difficult than 
diagnosis of somatic, or general medical, disorders, since there is no definitive lesion, 
laboratory test, or abnormality in brain tissue that can identify the illness.” Id. “The 
development of morbid anatomy and histology in the nineteenth century . . . showed that 
many diseases defined as syndromes were in fact associated with identifiable lesions. 
This led to the view that the demonstration of such an identifiable lesion was the defining 
characteristic of disease . . . There are many problems with this clear-cut and initially 
appealing view, especially perhaps as far as much of psychiatry is concerned.…however, 
in psychiatry no physical basis has been defined for most of the major syndromes.” EVE 
C. JOHNSTONE, ET. AL. SCHIZOPHRENIA, CONCEPTS AND CLINICAL MANAGEMENT, 3 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
51 Cf. OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 3, at 46–47. See generally, Peter Zachar, 
Psychiatric Disorders are not Natural Kinds, 7 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL.  167–82 
(2000); Tim Thorton, Reliability and Validity, in Psychiatric Classification: Values and 
neo-Humeanism, 9 PHIL., PSYCHIATRY, & PSYCHOL. 229, 229–35 (2002). 
52 “Categorical labels imply the presence of natural boundaries between major 
syndromes, even though there is no empirical evidence for such boundaries. . . . Despite 
the pervasive assumption that mental disorders are categorical, there is little or no 
evidence that there are natural boundaries separating putative categories. . . . No one has 
ever found a set of symptoms, signs, or tests that separate mental disorders fully into non-
overlapping categories. C. Robert Cloninger, A New Conceptual Paradigm from Genetics 
and Psychobiology for the Science of Mental Health, 33 AUST. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 
174, 175–76 (1999). But see, Robert Kendell & Assen Jablensky, Distinguishing Between 
the Validity and Utility of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 7 (2003) 
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There is no logically necessary reason to believe that a patient with both 
“odd beliefs” and “distorted perceptions,” but with perfect social manner, 
presentation, and speech categorically suffers from the same mental illness 
as a patient who presents with reduced speech output, a flattened affect, lack 
of volition, and disorganized speech, but who also neither hallucinates nor 
possesses any delusions.53 The only reason to hold such a belief is if one 
already assumes the accuracy of the hypothesis that these are two 
presentations of the same illness. When the principal evidence for an 
organic basis for schizophrenia consists of the effects of drug therapies on 
schizophrenic patients, as in the anti-psychotic drug example discussed 
earlier, it does not help to show the diagnosis itself is an empirically valid 
category and not an artificially assembled collection of symptoms. Just as a 
single symptom can be symptomatic of multiple illnesses, a single drug may 
prove effective treatment for multiple illnesses.54 This is even more relevant 
in practice because prescription psychoactive drugs have mixed therapeutic 
success,55 making the epistemological status of diagnostic categories as they 
are applied in practice even more dubious than they are in theory. 
Some MRI studies have shown certain brain-imaging scans to have a 
correlation with schizophrenia. 56  However, in all of these studies, most 
subjects with brain scans showing patterns positively correlating with 
schizophrenia do not develop schizophrenia, and a portion of those subjects 
with brain scans showing patterns negatively correlating with schizophrenia 
go on to develop schizophrenia anyway.57 Because these MRI results are 
                                                                                                                              
(discussing the numerous commentators in the field who dispute the empirical validity of 
psychiatric diagnostic categories). 
53 To borrow from the DSM-IV-TR’s diagnostic criteria, see DSM-IV-TR, supra note 
41, at 312. 
54 Consider, for example, how many different conditions and diseases might be 
ameliorated by aspirin or penicillin. 
55 For example, with regard to anti-depressants, see Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 193–94. 
56 See Shenton et al., supra note 48, at 1. 
57 See id. For an excellent example of one study showing an unusually high degree of 
correlation, see Dominic E. Job et al., Grey Matter Changes Can Improve the Prediction 
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neither necessary nor sufficient for identifying schizophrenia,58 they in no 
way validate the somatic existence of schizophrenia as a syndrome 
described in the DSM. The MRI results may simply correlate, directly or 
indirectly, to one of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia without 
correlating to the others, therefore providing little support for framing the 
category of schizophrenia in the way psychiatrists have chosen to do so.59 If 
a certain individual’s MRI results correlate strongly with flattened affect,60 
the individual’s results would likely also correlate with schizophrenia 
regardless of the actual predictive value of MRI results for schizophrenia’s 
other symptoms. This is because anyone with flattened affect, already 
meeting one criterion for schizophrenia, would have to meet fewer other 
criteria than those without flattened affect. Given this, the MRI results 
would merely delineate a population that partially meets one criterion for 
schizophrenia, so even if individuals in that population were no more likely 
than others to possess any of the other symptoms ascribed to schizophrenia, 
they would still be more likely than average to fulfill the diagnostic criteria 
as a whole.61 
In this way, MRI studies provide only a false appearance of biological 
grounding for schizophrenia.62 In reality, the use of MRI data does nothing 
                                                                                                                              
of Schizophrenia in Subjects at High Risk, BMC MEDICINE, Dec. 2006, at 29. Note, 
however, that even in Job’s study, which took a population of “high risk” patients and a 
low risk control group, most of those with an MRI pattern best predicting schizophrenia 
never developed schizophrenia, and many of those without it did. See id. 
58 See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 41, at 299, 305. But see Dassori, Miller & Saldana, supra 
note 8, at 304. 
59 Cf. Thornton, supra note 51, at 229–35. 
60 Flattened affect (also termed “blunted affect”) is a term for a lack of emotional 
expression and expressive gestures. See GEORGE STEIN & GREG WILKINSON, SEMINARS 
IN GENERAL ADULT PSYCHIATRY 174 (2d ed. 2007). 
61 This group would need only one other Criterion A symptom whereas the rest of the 
population would need two, so it would appear to be more likely to have “schizophrenia” 
than the general population. 
62 One of the most promising bits of MRI data was a finding that groups of 
schizophrenics on average had less gray matter volume than control groups. See Beng-
Choon Ho et al., Long-term Antipsychotic Treatment and Brain Volumes: A Longitudinal 
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more than adding another inconclusive psychiatric symptom to the list 
would. Unusual MRI scans are indicative of some biological state or 
condition, but this is not in and of itself the syndrome described by the 
DSM-IV-TR criteria for schizophrenia for the simple reason that no MRI 
result includes or excludes the full population diagnosed as schizophrenic.63 
Even if the available neuroscientific evidence is insufficient to validate 
psychiatric classifications, presenting any sort of neuroscientific data or 
claims (whether it is adequate evidence or not) as backing those 
classifications will often convince people that they are valid.64 
Even if all of the potential combinations of symptoms were to respond 
favorably to the same treatments, plenty of medical illnesses with clearly 
different and unrelated etiologies and presentations are treatable in the same 
manner.65 While it is true that varied symptomatic presentation alone does 
                                                                                                                              
Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 128 (2011).  
More recent studies however have found that gray matter loss actually correlates with the 
use of antipsychotic medication where the greater the amount of antipsychotics one takes, 
the more gray matter one loses. See id. at 134. 
63 See Job et al., supra note 57, at 29. 
64 “Explanations of psychological phenomena seem to generate more public interest 
when they contain neuroscientific information. Even irrelevant neuroscience information 
in an explanation of a psychological phenomenon may interfere with people’s abilities to 
critically consider the underlying logic of this explanation. We tested this hypothesis by 
giving naïve adults, students in a neuroscience course, and neuroscience experts brief 
descriptions of psychological phenomena followed by one of four types of explanation, 
according to a 2 (good explanation vs. bad explanation) x 2 (without neuroscience vs. 
with neuroscience) design. Crucially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the 
logic of the explanation, as confirmed by the expert subjects. Subjects in all three groups 
judged good explanations as more satisfying than bad ones. But subjects in the two 
nonexpert groups additionally judged that explanations with logically irrelevant 
neuroscience information were more satisfying than explanations without. The 
neuroscience information had a particularly striking effect on nonexperts’ judgments of 
bad explanations, masking otherwise salient problems in these explanations.” Deena 
Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 470 (2008). 
65 For example, many different types of infectious agents present similar symptoms like 
fever, and respond favorably to the same antibiotics. C.f. RICHARD A. HARVEY, PAMELA 
C. CHAMPE, & BRUCE D. FISHER, LIPPINCOTT’S ILLUSTRATED REVIEWS: 
MICROBIOLOGY ( 332-357) (describing numerous infectious agents and their symptoms 
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not mean that a diagnosis is an artificially established category, in medical 
diagnoses that can present with multiple symptoms, the illness is only 
classified specifically and definitively if there is a physically observable 
differential diagnostic criterion that can be applied regardless of the way the 
symptoms present.66  Here again, the issue is whether the symptoms would 
in fact provide evidence for the theory if the theoretical explanations for the 
theory were not already assumed. A collection of symptoms can provide 
evidence for the existence of a particular mental disorder only if the 
diagnostic criteria are already presumed to correspond to features of some 
real phenomenon.67 To cite another example, while Ritalin improves the 
study habits and exam scores of children with ADHD, it improves the study 
habits and exam scores of most people who take it, to the point of 
generating its own black market economy in schools.68 Ritalin’s effects, 
therefore, tell us very little about ADHD, just as looking at anti-psychotic 
drugs tell us very little about schizophrenia. Thus, looking at symptoms or 
effective treatments tells us very little about the root cause. 
2. Is Psychiatry Different from Other Medical Fields in this Regard? 
Many medical fields diagnose patients according to tests that lead 
physicians to infer the existence of underlying tissue pathology without 
observing it directly.69 We have every reason to believe that our mental 
experiences depend in part on the physical state of our brains, and we have 
every reason to believe that atypical brain states can produce atypical 
                                                                                                                              
and treatments, some of which have similar symptoms and respond to the same 
antibiotics). 
66 See generally Stephen Walter, Gold Standard Test, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
BIOSTATISTICS (2005). 
67 See David L. Sacket et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What it Is and What it Isn’t, 312 
BRIT. MED. J. 71, 71 (1996). 
68 Jeremy Laurance, Ritalin Abuse Hits Students Looking for an Exam Kick, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Aug. 26, 2003),  
http://www.nootropics.com/methylphenidate/index.html. 
69 See generally Walter, supra note 66. 
672 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 
mental states. 70  It therefore seems very reasonable to assume that 
profoundly abnormal mental experiences, such as daytime hallucinations, 
are or may be caused by organic brain abnormalities. 
A question arises: are psychiatric diagnoses un-testable, or simply 
difficult to test? One of the most famous criticisms of the scientific status of 
psychiatry is found in psychologist David Rosenhan’s “pseudo-patient” 
experiment where he found that his assistants could gain admittance into 
reputable hospitals and be diagnosed with schizophrenia simply by claiming 
to have had auditory hallucinations; no amount of subsequent observation 
was perceived as invalidating the original diagnosis 71  Rosenhan’s 
conclusion, that this implied psychiatric diagnosis was fundamentally 
unscientific, has been rightly criticized by retired professor of psychiatry 
Robert Spitzer, 72  among others, for only demonstrating that diagnostic 
reliability is difficult—and made more so when patients feign symptoms of 
known disorders.73  American neuroscientist Seymour Kety74  pointed out 
that if he was to drink a quart of blood and arrive at a hospital vomiting 
blood, the staff would consistently diagnose him with a bleeding peptic 
ulcer, but this misdiagnosis would not imply that medicine was incapable of 
                                                            
70 The effects of drugs and alcohol on the mind are reason enough to think this. 
71 See D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCI. 250, 250 (1973). 
72 Robert Spitzer, an extremely influential psychiatrist, is best known for leading the 
development of the DSM-III as the chair of the American Psychiatric Association’s Task 
Force on Nomenclature and Statistics.  Spitzer also chaired the APA Work Group to 
Revise the DSM-III, which produced the DSM-III-R and was a special advisor to the 
APA Task Force on the DSM-IV. See DSM-IV-TR CASE BOOK VOL. 2. : EXPERTS TELL 
HOW THEY TREATED THEIR PATIENTS xiii (Robert Spitzer et. al. eds., American 
Psychiatric Publ’g, Inc. 2006). 
73 See Robert L. Spitzer, More on Pseudoscience in Science and the Case for Psychiatric 
Diagnosis: A Critique of D. L. Rosenhan’s “On Being Sane in Insane Places” and “The 
Contextual Nature of the Psychiatric Diagnosis,” 33 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 459 
(1976). 
74 Seymour Kety was a very influential neuroscientist who developed the first method 
for measuring cerebral blood flow, researched genetic predisposition for schizophrenia, 
and served as the scientific director of the National Institute of Mental Health. See Phillip 
S. Holzman, Seymour S. Kety, M.D., 1915–2000, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1057, 1057 
(2000). 
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correctly diagnosing the condition.75 This analogy would be an apt one, 
except for the fact that it ignores the epistemologically relevant difference 
between the type of claim being made when someone attributes vomiting to 
an ulcer and when someone attributes hallucinations to schizophrenia. 
The difference is that while a physician would not be able to assess 
during an initial examination whether someone was vomiting blood because 
the patient had an ulcer or because the patient drank a quart of blood, the 
etiological theory that the patient had an ulcer is in principle confirmable 
through visual inspection via endoscopy. However, no analogous possibility 
exists with mental disorders. In non-speculative physical medicine, 
although patient self-reports might lead to a diagnosis, the diagnoses are 
based on an etiological theory derived from physical observation of the 
biological mechanisms that could produce such symptoms.76 To return to an 
earlier analogy, successfully applying “percussive maintenance” to a 
television with a fuzzy picture might provide evidence that the TV suffered 
from a problem in the vacuum tube’s power supply, but this is only because 
people have opened up other malfunctioning televisions to examine their 
wiring. There is no meaningful way to physically observe the cause of most 
human behavior, including hallucinations and other bizarre mental 
phenomena that seem necessarily organic in origin. Even neural imaging 
fails to demonstrate causality because neuroanatomy and the degree of 
blood flow to relevant parts of a brain are affected by external stimuli as 
well.77 Behaviors can be both plausibly explained as caused by or causing 
their neurological correlates. 
                                                            
75 See Seymour S. Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 957, 
959 (1974). 
76 See Sackett et al., supra note 67, at 72. 
77 For example, talk therapy demonstrates distinct brain changes in patients suffering 
from depression. See Kelly Connelly, Therapy Show a Distinct Pattern of Brain Changes 
(Patients Recovering From Depression), MED. NEWS TODAY (Jan. 6, 2004),  
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/5181.php. 
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We can also imagine instances where direct observation of the 
relationship between a symptom and an underlying cause is in fact 
available. If a patient suddenly has the subjective mental experience of 
being unable to see, and CT scans of other patients with this subjective 
mental experience have revealed tumors pressing against the optic nerve, 
then the patient’s mental experience could provide empirically meaningful 
evidence to suggest the possible presence of a brain tumor, even without a 
CT scan. Of course, blindness would not provide irrefutable evidence of a 
brain tumor, but it rather provides some evidence in proportion to the 
likelihood of a brain tumor explaining the mental phenomenon. This 
likelihood is itself scientifically determinable by analyzing the frequency 
that brain tumors can be confirmed by CT scans in patients with such 
mental experiences. 
Where scientifically verifiable means of relating a symptom to an 
underlying cause are available, however, the diagnosis is based not on the 
methods of psychiatry but on the methods of clinical neurology. 78 
Neurologists in these instances provide only epistemologically satisfying 
evidence. Symptom interpretation here depends on the extent to which 
doctors can directly observe tissue pathology in a patient’s brain and relate 
those observations to behaviors and experiences. The psychiatric methods 
of diagnosis add nothing in these instances and have no clear intersection 
with neurology’s methods.79 
3. Could Psychiatry Be Scientific in the Way Other Highly Theoretical 
Fields Can Be Scientific? 
Psychiatry is not the only field that both holds itself out as scientific and 
advances claims about subjects that seem to have a physical basis but 
                                                            
78 See John Horgan, The Undiscovered Mind: How the Human Brain Defies Replication, 
Medication, and Explanation, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 470, 473 (1999). However, 
“[n]euroscience has had virtually no payoff in terms of diagnosing and treating mental 
illness.” Id. 
79 Cf. id. 
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cannot be observed directly. Theoretical physicists also study presumably 
physical subjects beyond possible human observation. However, there is a 
critical difference. When the subject of a physicist’s inquiry is an 
unobservable phenomenon, a physicist will extrapolate the existence of an 
unobservable phenomenon through the application of knowledge of the 
laws of physics determined from direct observation. Thus, the underpinning 
of a physicist’s theory of unobservable phenomenon remains grounded in 
and derivable from what he or she can observe. 
For example, while a black hole or an electron might be unobservable, 
their existence is scientifically verifiable because the mechanisms by which 
observable objects interact with each other form systematically discernible 
“laws of physics,” which can be scientifically verified (or at least confirmed 
to a high level of probability).80 These laws, when coupled with observable 
data, can provide empirically meaningful support for hypotheses about the 
unobservable phenomena they imply. If a physicist, observing a star 
wobbling in a particular way, hypothesizes that this is due to the presence of 
an unobserved massive celestial object in its vicinity, the hypothesis is 
scientifically grounded to the extent that physicists have observed other 
stars wobbling in the presence of observable massive celestial objects.81  
Even without directly “seeing” a black hole, a physicist can hypothesize its 
presence scientifically by comparing the behavior of a star in the black 
hole’s vicinity with the way other stars are affected by the gravity of large 
observable celestial bodies. The unobservable phenomenon is thereby 
inferred from observable, empirically accessible data. 
                                                            
80 See generally Jean Schneider, New Worlds Outside the Solar System, 10 EUR. REV. 
185, 188-190 (2002) (describing the “stellar-wobble” technique of exosolar planet 
detection, where stars are observed for a “wobble” characteristic of a planet’s 
gravitational field effecting the star’s path.  In this way, while the planet itself cannot be 
directly viewed, the laws of gravity suggest that a star ‘wobbling’ in such a manner does 
so because of another large but smaller mass, thus the existence of a planet is inferred 
from the empirical data, but not observed directly.) 
81 See id at 188-190. 
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Starting from the presumption that subjective mental experience has a 
physical basis in the brain, we have every reason to think that if a patient 
suffers from hallucinations, he or she may have something physically 
atypical about his or her brain.  However, this is where psychiatric 
methodology diverges from the methodology of theoretical physics. Not 
only is any interaction between a particular abnormal behavior and the 
purportedly physical mental illness unobservable, but psychiatric methods 
offer no way to observe analogous interactions. In other words, there are no 
fully observable systems in psychiatry to form an equivalent empirical basis 
for their inferences. 
C. Conclusion to Part One 
It has been suggested that the need to place psychiatry within the realm of 
medicine as a science is socially motivated: a way of raising the prestige of 
mental health professions and reducing the stigma of their patients. 82 
However, Part One of this article has shown that psychiatry and clinical 
psychology cannot meet the standards of medicine, and thus awarding 
psychiatry the social status of medicine is unjustified. In his paper, “On 
Being Sane in Insane Places,” Rosenhan raised the issue of whether 
observed patient symptoms produced consistent psychiatric diagnoses, or 
whether, instead, once labeled with a diagnosis, all data from a patient could 
be, and in fact was, interpreted as consistent with the diagnosis.83 When 
Freud’s patients responded positively to his psychoanalytic interpretations, 
he felt that the data confirmed his descriptions because they must have 
corresponded with what was real in the patient. But when Freud’s patients 
did not respond favorably, Freud attributed this to the strength and 
                                                            
82 See Sander L. Gilman, The Struggle of Psychiatry with Psychoanalysis: Who Won?, 13 
CRITICAL INQUIRY 293, 295–96 (1987). 
83 See Rosenhan, supra note 71, at 250. 
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resistance of the neurosis he described, so these data also confirmed his 
description.84 
When the APA voted to remove homosexuality from its list of mental 
disorders in the DSM-II, Rosenhan remarked that the fact a professional 
organization could vote on whether or not a particular human experience 
should be perceived as a “disorder” according to shifts in social perception 
underscored the difference between psychiatric disorders and medical 
ones. 85  Even now, the APA is planning to delete dozens of “mental 
disorders” currently listed in the DSM-IV-TR from the new DSM-V 
(expected in May 2013) while it simultaneously classifies new sets of 
behaviors that people have long engaged in as criteria for mental 
disorders.86 Some might protest that physicists also “vote” on the validity of 
proposed laws of nature in that they collectively deem some theories 
sufficiently supported and others not. The truth-value in physics, however, 
does not ultimately depend on the opinions of physicists; some proofs work 
mathematically and others do not. While Galileo’s heliocentric theory of the 
solar system was rejected by the church-based intellectual establishment of 
his day, he had reason to think he was nonetheless correct because his 
theory was confirmable by observing the sky, rather than “confirmed” only 
through the consensus of other physicists. 
Psychotherapeutic theories, whether in the form of psychiatric diagnoses 
or psychoanalytic descriptions, seem to be independent of and imposed on 
data, rather than being dependent on and derived from data. Although these 
psychiatric and psychotherapeutic practices could be extremely useful to 
and improve the quality of life for some people, this usefulness does not 
                                                            
84 See Epistemological Liabilities, supra note 9, at 322. 
85 See LAURA SLATER, OPENING SKINNER’S BOX: GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPERIMENTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 80 (2004). 
86 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Proposed Draft Revisions to DSM Disorders and 
Criteria, DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/Default.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
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provide the scientific status common to most modern medicine.87 To make 
this distinction, psychoanalysis and psychiatry must be evaluated not only 
in terms of the efficacy of their clinical practice, but also as academic 
disciplines claiming to present evidence about the facts of the world. In this 
regard, psychotherapeutic theories might be better conceptualized not as 
scientific hypotheses, but as narrative descriptions88 While not scientifically 
verifiable in the same manner as neurology or other medical disciplines, 
psychotherapeutic theories may nonetheless be useful narratives, helpful in 
developing a sympathetic understanding of individuals’ circumstances and 
experiences. Even though psychotropic drugs tell us little about who has a 
mental illness—and many are ineffective for treatment purposes—some 
people still find them useful in dealing with the problems they face daily. 
The ability to name the source of one’s problems can potentially feel 
empowering or provide relief, even if there is no substance behind the name 
apart from the institutional conventions of psychiatrists. Scientific 
verification might then be unnecessary for the successful application of 
psychiatry in a voluntary treatment setting. The same, however, may be 
equally true of other unscientific treatments that some people nonetheless 
find useful, like acupuncture. The fact that a treatment works does not mean 
that it works for the reasons the practitioner says it works. Thus, successful 
treatment does not necessarily justify regarding the practitioner as an expert 
on the maladies he or she seeks to treat. 
III. PART TWO: PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES AS LEGAL EVIDENCE 
The inherent epistemological liabilities of psychiatry have the potential to 
cause profound problems in civil cases and the criminal justice system. In a 
voluntary treatment setting, the epistemological questions are less important 
since no one is in conflict. In an adversarial setting, where the question is 
                                                            
87 See Kendell & Jablensky, supra note 52, at 7. 
88 Cf. Gardner, supra note 29, at 186–90 (arguing for an increasingly comprehensive 
approach to psychology). 
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not simply what treatment could be effective but what version of the truth is 
accurate, the epistemological questions matter profoundly because courts 
must resolve a dispute between two parties, both advancing claims of fact to 
support their desired outcomes. When providing evidence to establish the 
legal elements for involuntary commitment, to use an insanity defense in 
criminal trials, or to decide which patients are able to access potentially 
helpful medication and which are restricted to non-medical treatments and 
so on, description of the patient’s alleged mental illness will privilege one 
party’s interests against another’s. Epistemological problems in psychiatry 
may be unimportant to the voluntary patient who finds his or her treatment a 
worthwhile experience, but these problems defeat the entire purpose of 
permitting psychiatric expert testimony in a court of law when attempting to 
determine the facts of a case. 
In the following section, I argue that the unjustifiable reliance on 
psychiatric expertise has the potential to produce substantively and 
procedurally unjust results. 
A. Psychiatric Testimony Does Not Contribute Meaningful Information 
Psychiatrists are often called to testify as to whether or not an undesirable 
behavior is caused by a mental illness. For example, in order to successfully 
argue an insanity defense, one must generally demonstrate that a mental 
illness affected the defendant’s reasoning about a crime and the defendant’s 
ability to “distinguish between right and wrong.”89 If a person is mentally 
ill, he or she is said to have diminished legal responsibility.90 Psychiatrists 
have no means of observing the interaction between the supposed “cause,” 
the mental illness, and the “effect” of the undesirable behavior. Instead, the 
only data available for diagnosing mental illness is the undesirable behavior 
itself. Rather than providing independent evidence of an illness, and 
                                                            
89 See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 134 (outlining the requisite conditions to be considered 
as having a mental disease or defect). 
90 See id. 
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evidence for how and why it causes an undesirable behavior, the 
psychiatrist does the opposite: he or she uses the undesirable behavior as 
evidence for the mental illness. 
In other words, while the psychiatrist has added his or her own 
completely unverifiable hypothesis for why a person acts the way he or she 
does, the psychiatrist has contributed absolutely no new evidence. 
Psychiatrists do not even help a court understand the evidence before it 
because, as described earlier, their methodology assumes the truth of 
unverifiable relationships between the data and psychiatric hypotheses. To 
describe a set of behaviors as symptoms of mental illness does nothing to 
bridge the explanatory gap as to the cause of the behaviors. Instead, it 
impresses the court with a sense of false necessity where judges and jurors 
are likely to feel compelled to defer to “expert” opinions of psychiatrists, 
often to a court’s detriment.91 
A United States Supreme Court case from 1983, Barefoot v. Estelle,92 
established that clinical opinions of psychiatrists could be employed to 
answer hypothetical questions about a defendant’s potential dangerousness, 
a practice employed extensively in Texas death penalty cases.93  In Texas, 
juries in capital cases actually used to vote on whether a defendant would 
receive the death penalty. 94  Psychiatrist James Grigson was frequently 
permitted to testify during death penalty sentencing that there was a “one 
hundred percent and absolute”95 chance that the accused would commit 
                                                            
91 See Weisberg et al., supra note 64, at 470 (explaining how explanations that use 
scientific jargon are often more persuasive to people, whether or not they are 
scientifically sound). 
92 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Morris v. 
Woodford, 229 F.3d 775 (2000). 
93 See Ron Rosenbaum, Travels With Dr. Death, VANITY FAIR, May 1990, at 141, 
reprinted in SAMUEL BRAKEL & ALEXANDER BROOKS, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 252 (2001). 
94 See id. 
95 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 919. 
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violent acts in the future96 without even examining the defendant.97 At the 
time, a person could only be sentenced to death in Texas if “there [wa]s a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society.”98 Grigson claimed that his 
predictions constituted “medical opinion[s] . . . particular to the field of 
psychiatr[y] and not to the average layman.”99 Justice Blackmun, remarking 
on the poor “present state of psychiatric knowledge,” dissented in Barefoot 
v. Estelle. Regarding Grigson, Blackmun wrote that “[i]n a capital case, the 
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an 
impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical 
specialist’s words, equates with death itself.” 100  While this example is 
unusually dramatic, the “inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s 
words”101 can prove decisive with judges and juries in more mundane civil 
commitment cases. In another case where serious doubt still exists as to 
defendant’s guilt, Grigon’s testimony may have contributed to the 
controversial execution of Cameron Todd Willingham.102 
In the landmark civil commitment case Addington v. Texas, 103  the 
appellant argued that since due process requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt for criminal trials, due process must similarly require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt before the state can deprive someone of their liberty 
through involuntary civil commitment.104 The US Supreme Court rejected 
this argument and found that, unlike in criminal trials, involuntary civil 
                                                            
96 See Rosenbaum, supra note 93, at 252–53. 
97 See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 923 n.6. 
98 Id. at 884. 
99 Id. at 918. 
100 Id. at 916. 
101 Id. 
102 For discussion of the controversy surrounding the facts of this case and Grigson’s role 
in it, see David Grann, Trial By Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009,  
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann?currentPage=all. 
103 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
104 Id. at 418. 
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commitment proceedings could effectively incarcerate people under a mere 
“clear and convincing” evidence standard.105  The outcome is that those 
merely alleged to be mentally ill are left with a second, lower due process 
entitlement and lesser state-recognized liberty interests.106 This result was 
only possible because of an unjustifiable deference to psychiatric expertise 
and a gross overestimation of the reliability of psychiatric evaluations and 
theories. 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Addington Court, explained that: 
Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either 
himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the 
meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert 
psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the 
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to 
whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an 
individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.107 
The Court concluded that the standard of proof should be lowered to 
accommodate this “fallibility” and “lack of certainty.”108 A more reasonable 
conclusion, however, would have been to recognize that psychiatrists and 
psychologists are not in a privileged position to interpret the facts of a case, 
and the spin they put on the facts should not be relied upon to tell a court 
what the facts mean for legal purposes. 
Federal Rule of Evidence (ER) 702 on expert witnesses superseded the 
older “general acceptance” test for whether expert scientific testimony is 
admissible.109 The rule states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
                                                            
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. at 429 (emphasis in the original). 
108 Id. 
109 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms, Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). 
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experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the 
principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.110 
By these criteria, a psychiatrist should not be able to qualify as an expert 
witness on questions of either the “mental illness” or “danger to oneself or 
others” criteria for civil commitment. Psychiatric explanations of mental 
illness are not the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
psychiatric evaluations of dangerousness are not particularly reliable.111 In 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., the US Supreme Court held 
that when faced with “expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge, 
pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether 
the testimony’s underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid 
and properly can be applied to the facts at issue.”112 While psychiatrists 
might argue that they enjoy “general acceptance” in the scientific 
community despite their methodological flaws, this should not permit them 
to testify as experts under the Daubert standard, which explicitly rejects the 
older “general acceptance” standard as a basis for evaluating expert 
witnesses.113 The Daubert Court further stated that “many considerations 
will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or technique in 
question can be (and has been) tested.”114 Because psychiatric theories of 
mental illness cannot be meaningfully tested, a trial court in a jurisdiction 
                                                            
110 FED. R. EVID. 702. 
111 A great deal of empirical research undermines the claim that psychiatrists are able to 
predict dangerousness effectively. For reviews of this literature that conclude that 
psychiatric dangerousness predictions are ineffective, see Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry 
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and 
Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1084–86 (1976); Bernard L Diamond, 
The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (1974).  
112 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 580. 
113 See id. at 579–80. 
114 Id. at 580. 
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following the Daubert standard should exclude psychiatrists as expert 
witnesses under ER 702. 
A possible objection to this line of argument may be that while 
psychiatrists do not have scientifically testable theories, they at least have 
extensive experience dealing with people who are “insane” or “mentally ill” 
in the lay sense of these terms. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the US 
Supreme Court found that Daubert’s judicial “gatekeeping” requirements 
and standards apply not only to “scientific” testimony but to any expert 
testimony (in the case, Carmichael sued Kumho Tire Company after a tire 
blew out in an automobile, resulting in an accident that killed a passenger 
and injured several others—a purported expert testified to defects in the 
tire).115 In Kumho Tire Co., the Court upheld the exclusion of the testimony 
of a “tire failure analyst” when a lower court found his methodology did not 
satisfy the Daubert interpretation of ER 702,116 even though the analyst 
relied on “skill” and “experience” in his “observations.” 117  Given the 
Kumho Tire Co. Court’s clarification of the Daubert standard, even if 
psychiatrists can claim to have skill and experience in dealing with people 
who are “crazy” in the lay sense of the word, that skill and experience 
would not be sufficient by itself to make their testimony admissible if the 
methodology they use cannot be shown to be reliable. 
B. Civil Commitment 
When people are deemed to be mentally ill, they may be legally deprived 
of their liberty in circumstances where non-mentally ill persons cannot 
be.118 Because the manner in which psychiatrists assign the status of mental 
illness is unscientific and epistemologically suspect, regardless of any 
legitimate governmental or social interests that might motivate civil 
                                                            
115 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999). 
116 See id. at 139. 
117 Id. at 147. 
118 Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic Medications: 
Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 417 (1988). 
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commitment laws, such laws will be necessarily unreliable in their 
application. There is then a profound danger of arbitrarily and unnecessarily 
incarcerating people who have committed no crime. This danger is 
amplified by the lack of due process afforded to people facing civil 
commitment and the unjustifiable deference given to psychiatric testimony. 
1. Why Civil Commitment? 
Before critiquing civil commitment, it is necessary to consider three 
possible reasons why allegedly mentally ill people are treated differently 
from others with regard to involuntary confinement. One reason, provided 
by Paul Applebaum, one of the leading defenders of civil commitment, is 
that the only justification for confining mentally ill people in circumstances 
where non-mentally ill people would not be confined is the potential for 
treatment.119 The entire purpose of commitment for Appelbaum, then, is 
compulsory treatment.120 
There are some immediate problems with this view. Were compulsory 
treatment the necessary and sufficient reason for civil commitment, then the 
only two elements for civil commitment that would make sense would be 
the presence of a mental illness and a refusal to accept treatment (or perhaps 
the presence of a severe mental illness, though it would be hard to imagine 
what non-arbitrary criteria could be devised to determine this outside of 
posing a danger to oneself or others). Instead, the overwhelming majority of 
mental commitment statutes also require potentially committed persons to 
be dangerous to themselves or others.121 The dangerousness criteria does 
not reasonably relate to compulsory treatment, since many people are 
mentally ill and refuse supposedly beneficial treatments, but are not 
committable because they are not dangerous. If the public interest in civil 
commitment is compulsory treatment, and not the protection of the public 
                                                            
119 See id. 
120 See id. 
121 See 56 C.J.S. Mental Health § 54 (2010). 
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or the “mentally ill” individual, then why should the state exempt people 
who would equally “benefit” from compulsory treatment but who pose no 
danger? 
There is a constitutionally protected right, derived from an individual’s 
liberty interests, to refuse medical treatment.122 The argument that mentally 
ill people would benefit from needed medical treatment, and that this 
benefit outweighs their right to refuse and therefore justifies commitment, 
would apply equally to anyone who refuses needed medical treatment. Yet, 
far from using the threat of commitment to coerce non-mentally ill people 
into needed treatment, the state instead applies the coercive power of the 
criminal and civil justice systems against doctors who attempt to override 
patient refusal by regarding nonconsensual medical treatment of 
“competent” patients as a battery.123 
A second explanation for civil commitment is found in the inclusion of 
the dangerousness criterion, which might imply that the state’s interest 
actually lies in its police power to protect society from dangerous 
individuals and protect individuals from themselves.124 However, if this is 
the state’s legitimate motive, why should it limit civil commitment to those 
who are both dangerous and mentally ill? Why not commit dangerous non-
mentally-ill people as well? It is not the case that only mentally ill people 
pose dangers to themselves. When non-mentally ill people refuse critical 
medical treatment, they could certainly be seen as a danger to themselves, 
and yet the refusal of medical treatment is a legally protected right.125 The 
                                                            
122 See 77 C.J.S. Right to Die § 2 (2011). That right goes so far as to permit a right to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment. See id. But see 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 470 (2012) 
(explaining that one exception to the right to die is when dying would constitute child 
abandonment). 
123 See Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (“[A] physician 
who treats a patient despite such a refusal is civilly (and criminally) liable for assault and 
battery.”). 
124 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979). 
125 See PAUL APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE 
LIMITS OF CHANGE 121-23 (1994). In fact, the right to refuse medical treatment exists 
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state also allows people to participate in many high-risk recreational 
activities such as cave diving, BASE jumping, or high-stakes gambling, and 
actually facilitates students acquiring six-figure non-dischargeable debt in 
an economy with uncertain job prospects. It would seem that, in general, 
any state interest in protecting people from themselves is rarely compelling 
enough to override personal liberty interests.126 
The state interest in preventing grave disability implied by the “gravely 
disabled”127 criterion that is used in some states’ commitment statutes128 
does little to resolve this problem. For example, California law allows the 
confinement of a person who, “as a result of a mental disorder, is a danger 
to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely disabled.”129 However, the 
same law also expressly prohibits confinement of people who are gravely 
disabled but not mentally ill.130 This seems to imply that the state then 
normally claims no sufficiently compelling interest in either preventing 
someone from becoming gravely disabled or compelling someone to 
recover from, treat, or ameliorate a grave disability. A gravely disabled 
person whose disability is caused by anything but mental illness is free to 
                                                                                                                              
even after involuntary commitment and requires subsequent judicial procedures to 
override. See id. 
126 There are notable exceptions, like seatbelt and helmet laws, but these are neither 
equivalent intrusions into personal liberty, nor are they enforced with incarceration or 
civil commitment for those who would ignore them. 
127 “Gravely disabled” is a term used in some states’ involuntary commitment statutes 
that may refer to “individuals who are incapable of providing for their basic survival 
needs,” or alternatively to individuals “unable to provide specific needs such as essential 
medical care, shelter, or safety, leading to serious physical debilitation or serious physical 
disease, or making the individual incapable of surviving safely in freedom.” 53 AM. JUR. 
2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 19 (2011). 
128 See Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to “Predict 
Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness” Literature, 
18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 44–45 (1994). 
129 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5150 (West 2012). In California, the maximum term of 
involuntary detention for gravely disabled people is capped at 47 days; in cases where 
continued treatment is deemed necessary conservator is appointed prior to the end of the 
47 days. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5270.55 (c). 
130 See id. 
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refuse a cochlear implant, artificial limb, or even a wheel chair; he or she 
may, to borrow Appelbaum’s expression, “rot with their rights on.”131 Why 
would the state have a greater interest in addressing the grave disability of 
mentally ill people than addressing the grave disability of non-mentally ill 
people? Surely the state’s interest in a person’s “ability” is in no way 
enhanced just because that person is mentally ill. 
A third possible justification is that mentally ill people are involuntarily 
committed because they are irrational, and mental illness implies 
irrationality.132 There are a number of problems with this justification. The 
first is that while people often accuse each other of being “irrational,” there 
is no generally agreed upon definition for rationality, nor is there any clear 
way to evaluate whether or not someone meets that standard. 133  Some 
would try to define rationality as “acting with self[-]interest,”134 but this 
fails to resolve the problem because “self-interest” is similarly controversial 
and problematic to define.135 How does someone determine what is in their 
self-interest, or in another’s self-interest? People frequently recognize that 
each individual is best positioned to decide what is in his or her self-
interest, though in some cases people with the power to do so 
paternalistically assert that socially less powerful people136 do not correctly 
assess what is in their own best interests. This form of paternalism, 
however, is not generally driven by any underlying, clarifying theory of 
                                                            
131 Appelbaum uses this rather derisive expression in a number of places. See, e.g., 
APPELBAUM, supra note 125, at 137. 
132 Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
133 See RANDALL COLLINS, SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO NON-
OBVIOUS SOCIOLOGY 4 (2d ed. 1992); Samantha Godwin, Children’s Oppression, Rights 
and Liberation, 4 NW. INTERDISC. L. REV. 247, 275–79 (2011). 
134 See William Guth & Ian Macmillan, Strategy Implementation Versus Middle 
Management Self-Interest, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 313, 313 (1986) (discussing the 
presumption). 
135 See id. 
136 Historical examples include women, slaves, and indigenous populations. Today, 
children are treated this way. See Godwin, supra note 133, at 275–79. 
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rationality or best interest; it is simply the assertion of a value judgment.137 
Value judgments of this type might be more or less persuasive, but they are 
not uncontroversial, nor do they rest on logical necessity. More importantly, 
there is no reason to think that psychiatrists are especially well-equipped to 
make these value judgments, so deferring to psychiatrists on questions of 
what is “irrational” and how much “irrationality” is sufficient for 
commitment makes little sense. 
The notion that mentally ill people can be confined because they are 
irrational is also unpersuasive. Irrationality and dangerousness, without 
mental illness, has not been regarded as sufficient for commitment (as 
reflected by the fact that mental illness is a required element or component 
of involuntary commitment statutes). For example, Christian Scientists and 
Jehovah’s Witnesses are motivated by beliefs they agree are not grounded 
in rationality, but instead dictated by faith. And yet, when these beliefs 
cause them to refuse lifesaving treatment, 138  the state is generally not 
permitted to intervene against their will.139 Several cases have found that 
irrationality is no obstacle for legal competence to make one’s own medical 
decisions, and a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment cannot be 
                                                            
137 See id. 
138 Christian Scientists reject all physical medical treatment; Jehovah’s Witnesses will 
accept some medical treatments, but not blood transfusions. See B.A. Robinson, Two 
Christian Groups that Oppose Medical Care, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG,  
http://www.religioustolerance.org/medical2.htm (last updated Aug. 1, 2010). 
139 See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Death § 463. There are some instances where courts have found 
that the state’s interests override an individual’s liberty or privacy interests; however, 
courts are often extremely deferential to patient’s right to refuse treatment. For instance, 
in In re Brown, an Illinois appeals court found that the trial court erred in allowing a 
pregnant Jehovah’s Witness to be transfused against her wishes according to the state’s 
interests in preserving her life and that of her viable fetus, finding instead that her right to 
refuse medical treatment was more compelling. See In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d. 397, 400 
(1997). The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that even where a Jehovah’s Witness 
(who did in fact die) had two children, “there is no evidence to suggest that any state 
interest in this case was compelling enough to override [the Jehovah’s Witness’s] refusal 
of blood. . . . There is no evidence that the state’s interest in protecting third parties is 
implicated here.” In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 505 (2001). 
690 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
NEW PERSPECTIVES 
overridden simply because he or she is irrational.140 In Rodriguez v. Pino, 
the Florida District Court of Appeals rejected two doctors’ arguments that 
Pino’s inability to “make a rational decision” rendered her incompetent to 
refuse medical treatment. 141 Instead, the court stated that “[o]bviously, a 
patient may not be deemed incompetent simply because his decision is not a 
medically appropriate one.”142 In Lane v. Candura, the Massachusetts Court 
of Appeals reversed a lower court’s decision to appoint a temporary 
guardian for a patient who refused a leg amputation, supposedly 
irrationally. The Massachusetts Court of Appeals found that “the 
irrationality of her decision does not justify a conclusion that Mrs. Candura 
is incompetent in the legal sense. The law protects her right to make her 
own decision.”143 If a patient could be considered incompetent to refuse 
medical treatment because doing so was not medically appropriate in a 
physician’s view, this would obviously make the right to refuse treatment 
meaningless. 
These cases imply that the state recognizes that it does not have a 
compelling interest in forced medical treatment, preventing dangerousness, 
or in confining “irrational” people, but that it does in confining only people 
who are both dangerous and mentally ill.144 Because the state does not 
confine people who are merely mentally ill and refusing treatment, it is not 
consistent to claim that the compelling interest is found in the state’s parens 
patriae interest to provide for citizens who cannot provide for themselves. 
Instead, one might infer that mentally ill people are assumed to be uniquely 
                                                            
140 Shine v. Vega, 709 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 1999); Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 
(N.J. 1985) (offering support for this view in addition to the two cases previously 
discussed). 
141 Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). 
142 Id. at 685. 
143 Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1231, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). 
144 For example, “Under the Texas Mental Health Code, however, the State has no 
interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not 
pose some danger to themselves or others.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 
(1979). 
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dangerous, threatening, or uncontrollable, or that psychiatrists are best 
equipped to predict dangerousness. Both assumptions are completely 
unfounded, as discussed in the next section. 
2. Mental Illness as an Element for Civil Commitment 
Involuntary civil commitment is a state law issue,145 and commitment 
statutes vary from state to state. However, the overwhelming majority of 
states require that in order to be involuntarily committed, a person must be 
both dangerous to him or herself, or others, and mentally ill—a mere 
finding of dangerousness is insufficient. 146  The reliance on “expert 
psychiatrists and psychologists”147 described by the Addington Court cannot 
be justified given the lack of scientific grounding in psychiatric theory. This 
unreliability is grounded by the reality that psychiatrists are not competent 
in reliably predicting future dangerousness, 148  and diagnoses of major 
mental illnesses are not meaningfully associated with future violence.149 
The MacArthur Research Network on Mental Health and the Law150 
conducted a study where 1,136 people admitted to acute civil inpatient 
facilities in Worcester, Kansas City, and Pittsburgh were interviewed over a 
period of twenty weeks from when they were discharged.151  The study 
found that a diagnosis of major mental disorders was actually associated 
with a lower rate of violence than disorders not typically subject to 
involuntary commitment, such as personality and adjustment disorders.152 A 
diagnosis of schizophrenia was particularly associated with lower rates of 
                                                            
145 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons § 4 (2011). 
146 See 56 C.J.S. Mental Health § 54 (2010). 
147 Addington, 441 U.S. at 429. 
148 See Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 111, at 1084–86; Diamond, supra note 111, at 
439–40. 
149 See Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur 
Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 566 (2000). 
150 See id. 
151 See id. 
152 See id. 
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violence, and there was no association with violence and delusions or 
hallucinations.153 The study found that predictive risk factors were largely 
demographic and that, unaided by actuarial data, psychiatrists are poor at 
predicting future violence.154 
The same group of researchers conducted an earlier study with five 
hundred people in Pittsburgh.155 The study compared a patient population to 
a general non-patient population where interviews with collaterals and 
police record checks were made to determine the prevalence of violence 
over a ten-week period. 156  The study found that “[t]he prevalence of 
violence among people who have been discharged from a hospital and who 
do not have symptoms of substance abuse is about the same as the 
prevalence of violence among other people living in their communities who 
do not have symptoms of substance abuse.”157 Of those who commit acts of 
violence, the types of violence committed by people who had been released 
from a mental institution and those who were in the community in the same 
period of time were similar in terms of type, target, and location.158 
Some judges have also expressed doubt that psychiatrists are able to 
predict future dangerousness. The Blackmun dissent in Barefoot v. Estelle, 
for example, cites numerous reports that question the ability of psychiatrists 
                                                            
153 See id. 
154 See MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L.  
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/mentalhome.html (last updated May 2004). 
155 See Henry J. Steadman, et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric 
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 393, 393 (1998). See also The MacArthur Commuinty Violence Study, 
MACARTHUR RES. NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH & L.,  
http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/violence.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) (discussing 
the Steadman, et al., study). 
156 See Steadman, et al., supra note 155, at 393. 
157 Id. Those patients who had substance abuse issues or were victims of crimes were 
more violent than substance abusers and victims of crimes who did not also have major 
mental illnesses. See id. The point remains, though, that major mental illness alone was 
not an indication of dangerousness, but it could be when combined with one of these 
three other factors. 
158 See id. 
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to predict dangerousness.159 The APA’s amicus brief in Estelle stated that 
“[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future 
dangerousness is by now an established fact within the profession.”160 The 
Estelle dissent also cites the APA’s “Draft Report of the Task Force on the 
Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process” as claiming that 
“[c]onsiderable evidence has been accumulated by now to demonstrate that 
long-term prediction by psychiatrists of future violence is an extremely 
inaccurate process.”161 Another commentator said that “[i]n general, mental 
health professionals . . . are more likely to be wrong than right when they 
predict legally relevant behavior. When predicting violence, dangerousness, 
and suicide, they are far more likely to be wrong than right.”162 Although 
Estelle dealt with death penalty sentencing testimony, the unreliability of 
psychiatric opinions on future dangerousness should equally call into 
question psychiatric testimony in civil commitment cases, where future 
dangerousness is also typically among the criteria the state must prove. 
3. Deprived of Liberty without Due Process of Law163 
Before a criminal court can deprive an accused person of his or her 
liberty, the state must have demonstrated proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 164  The US Supreme Court ruled in Addington v. Texas that due 
process for civil commitment does not require the same “proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard”—rather, it merely requires a “clear and 
convincing standard” of proof.165 The Addington Court’s reasoned that: 
[T]he state [should not] be required to employ a standard of proof 
that may completely undercut its efforts to further the legitimate 
                                                            
159 See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920–22 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
160 Id. at 920. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 The Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
164 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 421–422 (1979). 
165 Id. at 425. 
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interests of both the state and the patient that are served by civil 
commitments.”166 …  
We have concluded that the reasonable-doubt standard is 
inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the 
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the 
state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to 
needed medical treatment.167  
This reasoning is extremely flawed for numerous reasons. The fact that 
the “uncertainties of psychiatric diagnoses” are such that they cannot meet 
the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal cases 
is not a reason to arbitrarily lower the level of proof constitutionally 
required for due process. Instead, if psychiatric diagnoses cannot meet the 
burden of proof required by criminal due process to deprive someone of 
their liberty, psychiatric diagnoses should not be relied on when basic 
liberty is at stake. 
A significant reason why a “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is 
applied to criminal cases is because the public has a justifiable suspicion of 
the veracity of the state’s case. The mere fact that a police officer or a 
district attorney says that a person is a criminal who has committed a felony 
is grossly insufficient to persuade a court that the accused should be sent to 
prison. Instead, the state must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt 
because the state’s position alone is insufficient to justify a conviction.  
Psychiatric theories of mental illness lack a reliable basis in evidence. The 
fact that the state’s psychiatric witnesses receive greater deference than the 
state’s law enforcement officers or attorneys is entirely unjustifiable: at 
least a prosecutor is required to have some sort of material evidence, 
whether physical evidence or eyewitness testimony, to bring charges rather 
than relying on mere suspicion or opinion. A psychiatrist, however, is able 
to present no material evidence whatsoever. 
                                                            
166 Id at 430 (emphasis added). 
167 Id at 432 (emphasis added). 
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The argument that “[t]he state [should not] be required to employ a 
standard of proof that may completely undercut its efforts to further the 
legitimate interests of both the state and the patient that are served by civil 
commitments”168 entirely misses the purpose of constitutionally protected 
due process. Due process does not protect the “legitimate interests of the 
state,” but the liberty interests of the accused. Many crimes are extremely 
difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. For many of these difficult-to 
prove-crimes, the state has an arguably greater interest in criminal 
prosecution than any typical state interest in civil commitment. 169  The 
difficulty posed in the prosecution of these crimes does not justify lower 
due processes standards, and with good reason: the state has no legitimate 
interests in convicting people who are not proven guilty, and the standard of 
proof used to determine guilt is beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A legal finding of guilt is a status that can only be assessed in relation to 
a standard of proof—a person is guilty for legal purposes because he or she 
has been proven guilty according to a legal process that satisfies the state’s 
burden of proof. If the state arbitrarily lowered the standard of proof in 
criminal cases so that only clear and convincing evidence was sufficient to 
find guilt, then the state would be equally able to claim an interest in 
punishing that new and enlarged set of “guilty” people. When the state has 
demonstrated guilt to a clear and convincing standard, but not beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard undercuts the 
state’s interest in punishing people whose guilt is demonstrated clearly and 
convincingly. But the state has no legitimate interest in treating those 
people as guilty because the standard is not clear and convincing evidence 
of guilt, but evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
                                                            
168 Id. at 430. 
169 Perhaps the most widely discussed example is the difficulty of proving rape to such a 
standard where no physical evidence exists, coupled with the vital social importance of 
prosecuting rapists. For discussion, see generally Shelia Weller, Why is Date Rape so 
Hard to Prove? 6 (4) HEALTH (TIME INC. HEALTH)  62 (Jul. 1992) (discussing these 
issues). 
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The same reasoning applies with regard to civil commitment. The state 
can only claim a legitimate interest in committing people who are mentally 
ill and dangerous to a clear and convincing (but not beyond a reasonable 
doubt) standard if it is presupposed that the legal threshold for mental 
illness and dangerousness is clear and convincing evidence and not the 
beyond reasonable doubt standard. The Addington Court’s logic, then, is 
entirely circular. It implicitly posits a legally relevant standard of proof for 
mental illness and dangerousness of less than beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard as a justification for insisting that the standard is too burdensome. 
Reasoning similar to the Addington Court’s logic is offered in Tippett v. 
Maryland: 
It must be recognized, however, that as to the ultimate issue of the 
inmate’s dangerousness, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
may in practical operation be too onerous. After all, the ultimate 
issue is not as in a criminal case whether an alleged act was 
committed or event occurred, but the much more subjective issue 
of the individual’s mental and emotional character. Such a 
subjective judgment cannot ordinarily attain the same “state of 
certitude” demanded in criminal cases.170 
It is, of course, often true that a finding of dangerousness cannot “attain 
the same ‘state of certitude’” as “demanded in criminal cases.”171 But this 
again fails to provide a credible justification for lowering the standard, 
making it is easier to lock people up whose dangerousness is less certain. 
Whether the deprivation of liberty is to be justified by the fact of an action 
that actually occurred, or a Minority Report-style172 future prediction of 
                                                            
170 Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1165 (4th Cir.1971). 
171 See id. at 1165. 
172 See generally PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT (2002). “The Minority 
Report,” a famous science fiction short story by Philip K. Dick, involves individuals in 
law enforcement with the ability to predict future crimes and imprison people 
accordingly. This story was supposed to be dystopian, but it is essentially the same theory 
that civil commitment operates under. However, “precrime” predictions in “The Minority 
Report” were said to be highly accurate, whereas our courts acknowledge the fallibility of 
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dangerousness, the loss of liberty is the same. It is completely unreasonable 
to argue that the standard of proof for confining someone for the possibility 
that they might commit a crime should be lower than the standard of proof 
required for confining someone for actually having committed a crime. In 
the former instance, the harm to society posed by the accused is purely 
theoretical; in the latter case, it is actual. The standard of proof used in a 
trial “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants,”173 and where 
the interest of the individual greatly outweighs the interest of the state, the 
standard of proof should allocate the risk overwhelmingly to the state.174 
Whether in a criminal trial or civil commitment proceeding, individuals 
stand to be deprived of the same liberty interest, and since it is unreasonable 
to think that the state has a greater interest in preventing theoretical harm 
than in deterring actual harm, it follows that the risk of error should be 
distributed even more extensively onto the state in civil commitment 
hearings than in criminal trials.  
It is possible that the interest in punishing people for crimes they have 
already committed is different and less than the state’s interest in preventing 
future harm.175 To punish someone for a crime that is already in the past 
may do little to remedy the damage, whereas detaining someone so that they 
cannot commit an act of violence might actually prevent a crime from 
taking place.176 To tease out the different interests at work in these two 
                                                                                                                              
psychiatric diagnoses, but nonetheless allow psychiatrists to exercise similar power. For 
example, see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 432 (1979) as earlier discussed.  
173 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). 
174 Id. at 427 (“The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk 
of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any 
possible harm to the state. We conclude that the individual’s interest in the outcome of a 
civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the 
state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence.”). 
175 This point was brought to my attention by Heathcote Wales in comments on an early 
draft of this paper. 
176 Id. 
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scenarios, consider three principle justifications for criminal punishment.177 
First, punishing criminals might serve to deter others from committing the 
same crime in the future, thus preventing future harm.178 Second, physically 
imprisoning people incapacitates them from harming society while 
imprisoned.179 Third, punishment fulfills a retributive role of justice that 
sets moral standards of acceptable behavior for society by meting out “just 
deserts.”180  
The police power aspect of civil commitment is, for the most part, 
justified by only the second state interest: it protects society through 
incapacitating the committed person. Most criminal prison sentences are 
justified on all three grounds because they deter, incapacitate, and exact 
retribution. If civil commitment is justified only in terms of incapacitation, 
but criminal punishment is justified by incapacitation, deterrence, and 
retribution, then the state would seem to have greater interests in punishing 
criminals than involuntarily committing patients. 
There are cases, however, where criminal punishment cannot be justified 
by deterrence or incapacitation. For example, consider a single individual 
convicted of voluntary manslaughter committed “in the heat of passion” 
under circumstances extremely unlikely to be repeated. If the crime of 
voluntary manslaughter due to a “reasonable” emotional rage always went 
unpunished, then there would be less to deter people from committing the 
crime in the future. However, a robust deterrent effect could be sustained 
even if a small number of individuals went unprosecuted (perhaps the ones 
                                                            
177 Of course, there are many other justifications for punishment, and this is a necessarily 
simplified presentation. See Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
178 See e.g., Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley & Paul Robinson, Why Do We Punish?  
Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 284, 284–99 (2002); JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: 
PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 229 (2003). 
179 See Legal Punishment, supra note 177. 
180 For discussion, see John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, NOT JUST DESERTS: A 
REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6 (Oxford: Claredon Press 1990). 
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least likely to recommit). Moreover, the effect of deterrence on true crimes 
of passion is debatable. Such crimes are surely less likely to be deterred by 
punishment than premeditated and rationally self-interested crimes. 
Incapacitation would also be an insufficient reason to lock people up in 
this situation since they would pose no danger to others, and because the 
circumstances in which they killed would not likely arise again. The only 
justification left for punishing these crimes of passion at all would be 
retribution and social condemnation. These interests may very well be less 
compelling than the state’s interest in preventing future violence, a 
supposed purpose for civil commitment. However, the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard is not reserved only for crimes in which the state 
has a singular, potentially lesser, interest. The proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard is instead applied to all crimes, including those where 
deterrence and incapacitation are the most prominent interests served 
through punishment. When considering the rationale for different standards 
of proof between criminal punishment and civil commitment, it is necessary 
to consider the public interests implicated by the entire range of crimes that 
require a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard, rather than only the 
crimes where the state may plausibly have diminished interests in 
prosecution. 
The Addington Court again applies circular reasoning by beginning from 
the implicit premise that an individual subject to civil commitment 
proceedings is, in fact, mentally ill: 
The heavy standard applied in criminal cases manifests our 
concern that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized 
even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free. The full 
force of that idea does not apply to a civil commitment. It may be 
true that an erroneous commitment is sometimes as undesirable as 
an erroneous conviction. . . . Moreover, it is not true that the 
release of a genuinely mentally ill person is no worse for the 
individual than the failure to convict the guilty. One who is 
suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need of 
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treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma. It cannot 
be said, therefore, that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 
“go free” than for a mentally normal person to be committed.181 
By arguing that a mentally ill person is not “wholly at liberty” and 
implying that it is, therefore, worse “for the individual” to allow a 
“genuinely mentally ill person” to “go free” than it would be to allow a 
guilty person to go free, 182  the Addington Court presupposes that the 
individual in question is, in fact, “genuinely mentally ill.” Obviously, 
releasing a person who is not actually mentally ill has the same 
consequences as releasing a person who is not actually guilty: namely, 
preserving their freedom rather than wrongfully depriving them of it. The 
Addington Court itself recognizes this issue, stating “[t]his Court repeatedly 
has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a 
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.”183 
The Addington Court’s claim that mentally ill people are not totally free 
from stigma when not confined184 has identical problems. Accepting the 
highly questionable claim that the “mentally ill” are not “free from stigma” 
whether they are committed or not, courts cannot simply presume that 
anyone alleged to be mentally ill is in fact mentally ill. Civil commitment 
also has obviously stigmatizing effects.185 The Addington decision states 
that:  
[I]t is indisputable that involuntary commitment to a mental 
hospital after a finding of probable dangerousness to self or others 
can engender adverse social consequences to the individual. 
Whether we label this phenomena “stigma,” or choose to call it 
something else, is less important than that we recognize that it can 
                                                            
181 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979) (internal citations omitted). 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 425. 
184 See id. at 429. 
185 See Bruce Link & Jo Phelan, Labeling and Stigma, in A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY 
OF MENTAL HEALTH: SOCIAL CONTEXTS, THEORIES, AND SYSTEMS 571, 573 (Teresa 
Scheid & Tony Brown eds., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Labeling and Stigma]. 
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occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the 
individual.186 
There is no meaningful way to compare the consequences of false 
negatives across categories for policy purposes without knowing the ratio of 
false negatives to true negatives. This problem reaches the point of 
absurdity when it is recognized that the category of legal guilt exists only as 
a product of judicial process—one is legally innocent until proven legally 
guilty by a court of law. While the acts that evidence guilt in a crime have a 
separate ontological existence from a finding of guilt, there is no test for 
guilt independent of the judicial system that would produce the potential 
false negatives and false positives.187 Similarly, while the behaviors and 
ideas taken to be “symptoms” of mental illness may have an ontological 
existence on their own, mental illness itself exists only insofar as 
psychiatrists label a set of attributes or persons as mentally ill. The 
comparison between the consequences of a mentally ill person being 
released to the consequences of a guilty person being released is entirely 
inappropriate and meaningless for policy purposes. 
The conclusion is also extremely strange because it implies that, 
consequences to the individual aside, it is worse for a mentally ill person to 
go free than a guilty person to go free. For example, it is hard to imagine 
any persuasive policy or legal argument that a murderer or mafia boss is 
better off on the streets than a potentially suicidal person. 
Another line of argument adopted in numerous decisions is that a civilly 
committed person need not be afforded the same protections as a suspect in 
a criminal case because the intent is not punitive.188 The Court in Addington 
writes, “there are significant reasons why different standards of proof are 
called for in civil commitment proceedings as opposed to criminal 
                                                            
186 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. 
187 Of course, while someone found innocent cannot later be found guilty for the same 
crime, one found guilty may later be legally exonerated—so this is a case where false 
negatives are a null set, but false positives are not. 
188 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D. Mentally Impaired Persons § 5. 
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prosecutions. In a civil commitment state power is not exercised in a 
punitive sense.”189 The Court cites State v. Turner190 for the proposition that 
“the State of Texas confines only for the purpose of providing care designed 
to treat the individual.”191 This reasoning was described more elaborately in 
Schall v. Martin, where the Court held that juveniles detained pending trial 
were not being punished, because the purpose of the detention was not 
expressly punitive, but to prevent them from committing crimes for which 
they otherwise may not have been detained. 192  The parallels with civil 
commitment for the mentally ill should be obvious: detention is supposedly 
justified not to punish someone for an action they have committed, but to 
prevent them from carrying out some act of violence.  
In the more recently decided Gilford v. People, the Colorado Supreme 
Court argued that “since commitment proceedings are not designed to 
address criminal conduct, but rather are concerned only with the present and 
future mental health and well-being of the mentally ill individual, it 
necessarily follows that ‘no penal or punitive considerations underlie the 
state’s interest in . . . commitment.’”193 This reasoning misses the crux of 
the issue: while the state has no interest in punishing people for being 
mentally ill, a person has an interest in not being punished. 
A defender of the Addington decision might contend that not only is the 
state’s intent non-punitive,194 but that a civilly committed person, though 
confined and deprived of liberty, does not in fact experience punishment in 
the same way as a convict because civil commitment is not similarly 
                                                            
189 Addington, 441 U.S. at 428. 
190 State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 666 (Tex. 1977). Turner challenged a judgment 
confining him indefinitely to a state mental hospital in Texas; the Turner court held that 
only a preponderance of the evidence was necessary for this indefinite commitment. Id. at 
563. 
191 Addington, 441 U.S. at 428, n.4. 
192 Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 253 (1984). 
193 Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 125 (Colo. 2000) (omission in original) (quoting People 
v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Colo. 1981)). 
194 See Gilford, 2 P.3d at 125. See also Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
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stigmatizing. Criminal convictions stigmatize by design because they serve 
to blame and denounce the convict for behavior that society deems 
intolerable—civil commitment, however, carries no such blame. Thus, the 
Addington Court might seem justified in thinking that the lack of punitive 
intent on the part of the state would be relevant—without punitive intent, 
there is perhaps less stigma. In this way, there might be less interest in 
avoiding civil commitment because commitment would not bring the social 
condemnation of a criminal conviction. 
This logic relies on a false understanding of the practical social 
consequences that result from being labeled mentally ill and  confined to a 
mental institution as a danger to oneself or others. Labeling theory and, 
more relevantly, “modified” labeling theory, as developed in the 1980s by 
Bruce Link and Jo Phelan of Columbia University’s School of Public 
Health, explain how stigma and subtle discrimination resulting from a 
mental illness label could have a tremendously negative impact on a 
person’s life.195  
Early in life, people in society develop a “lay theory about what it means 
to have a mental illness,”196 which shapes their expectations about whether 
people will reject others with “mental illness.”197 Because people who are 
labeled as having “mental illness” are also socialized in this manner, they 
may “act less confidently and more defensively, or they may simply avoid a 
potentially threatening contact altogether.” 198 This may result in 
uncomfortable social interactions, reduced self-esteem, and a diminished 
quality of life.199 Link and his colleagues found that people labeled with 
“mental illness” who recognize that others devalue and discriminate against 
                                                            
195 See Labeling and Stigma, supra note 185, at 573. 
196 Bruce Link & Jo Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, in DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A TEXT-
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the mentally ill respond to this recognition with secrecy, withdrawal, and 
attempts to educate about mental illness.200 Those who withdraw end up 
having a limited social network composed primarily of household 
members.201 Amy Kroska and Sarah Harkness tested a hypothesis that a 
cultural perception of mental illness as devalued and discriminated against 
negatively affects labeled persons, but not unlabeled ones, by comparing 
community residents to psychiatric patients according to their perceptions 
of “mentally ill persons,” “myself as I really am,” and “myself as others see 
me.”202 The stigmatizing associations between ratings for perceptions of 
“mentally ill persons,” “myself as I really am,” and “myself as others see 
me” was stronger in the labeled group than in the unlabeled group.203 
Additionally, the potential benefits of treatment do not prevent or reverse 
the negative effects of stigma. In a longitudinal study, Link found that 
reported experiences of discrimination continued to negatively impact 
former patients’ lives long after they were “far less symptomatic and largely 
drug and alcohol free.”204 A follow up study in 1997 by Link found that 
while “symptoms” improved after treatment, the effects of stigma on self-
esteem endured.205 
It is also generally questionable whether a criminal conviction carries 
more stigma than involuntary commitment for mental illness and 
dangerousness. Some crimes, especially violent crimes and sex crimes, are 
highly stigmatizing. Many non-violent crimes (such as marijuana 
possession, certain white collar offenses, etc.) seem to have minimal stigma 
attached in many communities. Prison sentences are generally seen as 
                                                            
200 See Bruce Link et al., A Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental Disorders: An 
Empirical Assessment, 54 AMERICAN SOC. REV. 400, 403 (1989). 
201 See id. 
202 Amy Kroska & Sarah K. Harkness, Exploring the Role of Diagnosis in the Modified 
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205 See id. 
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highly stigmatizing,206 but they may be less so in communities that have a 
large population that have been in prison.207 More robust due process rights 
are afforded to defendants in many cases that do not even attach to a prison 
term. By comparison, mental illness might be a stigma of rather mythic 
proportions: it is common to declare the most despicable public enemies as 
“insane.” For example, Hitler is popularly described as “insane,”208 as are 
Kim Jong Il,209 Saddam Hussein210, and comic book super villains.211  
When considering a jurisprudentially consistent due process standard for 
depriving someone of liberty, the relevant interests to consider are not the 
state’s interests, but the interests of the person whose liberty hangs in the 
balance. To an individual who expresses no interest in mental health 
treatment but a profound interest in his or her freedom, the state’s purpose 
is essentially irrelevant. This logic was applied in Specht v. Patterson, 
where the court held that “the punishment under the second Act is criminal 
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probably better propaganda than simply declaring a political enemy insane, because it 
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punishment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to 
keep individuals from inflicting future harm.”212 
The assertion that the state’s supposed interest ought to be the deciding 
factor in how much due process someone is afforded invites the possibility 
that the state could reduce its burden and imprison more people simply by 
relabeling socially undesirable groups subject to civil, rather than criminal, 
sanctions. This possibility was hinted at in Powell v. Texas, a case in which 
a person convicted of public drunkenness attempted to rely on the excuse 
that he was “mentally ill” with “alcoholism.”213 The Powell Court stated: 
[T]he medical profession cannot, and does not, tell us with any 
assurance that, even if the buildings, equipment and trained 
personnel were made available, it could provide anything more 
than slightly higher-class jails for our indigent habitual inebriates. 
Thus we run the grave risk that nothing will be accomplished 
beyond the hanging of a new sign—reading “hospital”—over one 
wing of the jailhouse. One virtue of the criminal process is, at 
least, that the duration of penal incarceration typically has some 
outside statutory limit; this is universally true in the case of petty 
offenses, such as public drunkenness, where jail terms are quite 
short on the whole. “Therapeutic civil commitment” lacks this 
feature; one is typically committed until one is “cured.” Thus, to 
do otherwise than affirm might subject indigent alcoholics to the 
risk that they may be locked up for an indefinite period of time 
under the same conditions as before, with no more hope than 
before of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of periodic 
“freedom.”214 
Far from reducing the need for due process protections, supposedly non-
punitive civil commitment can result in a longer and more severe loss of 
freedom. As the Powell Court described, renaming a jailhouse wing to 
“hospital” hardly alleviates the harms of confinement.215 It is also certainly 
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not clear that confinement in a mental institution is a lesser loss of liberty 
than confinement in a prison. Involuntary commitment in a mental 
institution, like a prison, locks people away against their will, depriving 
them of their freedom of movement and ability to participate in society at 
large. While most patients in the majority of mental hospitals may have 
better conditions than those in super-max prisons, defendants serving time 
in comparatively comfortable minimum security prisons and federal prison 
camps still enjoy a right to be tried by a beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard. Patients may be subjected to pressure and leveraging to compel 
them to take psychotropic medication against their will; they can be 
mechanically restrained and injected with mind-altering drugs; many are put 
in conditions essentially comparable to solitary confinement (euphemized 
as “seclusion”).216 In these ways, it is easy to imagine that involuntary 
commitment can sometimes represent a more extreme and total loss of 
liberty than many prison terms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Having explained why psychiatry is not, and cannot be, a legitimate 
science capable of informing the meaning of facts to a court and how the 
specter of mental illness is used as an unjustifiable means of circumventing 
due process, I conclude with some brief but substantial recommendations 
for mental health law reform. 
First, psychiatric diagnoses should not form part of the criteria for 
determining who is civilly committable. As described in Part One, theories 
of mental illness are unverifiable and the concept of specific and discrete 
diagnoses is incoherent. As described in Part Two, the presence of a 
diagnosis of major mental illness, or of hallucinations or delusions, is not by 
itself predictive of future violence. Psychiatrists are extremely poor at 
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predicting “dangerousness,” rendering them useless for the purposes relied 
on for civil commitment. Retaining psychiatrically described “mental 
illness” as a criterion for involuntary commitment arbitrarily privileges the 
collective and individual guesses of a profession that is incapable of 
fulfilling the trust courts place in it. 
Second, while the state has a legitimate interest in preventing highly 
probable acts of violence, lowering the burden of proof in order to “prove” 
dangerousness is inconsistent with the notions of justice and fairness on 
which liberal democratic legal systems are based. Because the liberty 
interest implicated in civil commitment is the same as in criminal 
incarceration, for the state to legitimately confine someone on a theory of 
future dangerousness, due process should be understood to demand the 
same level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that is normally required to 
confine someone for extended lengths of time. Since, as the Addington 
Court argued, this higher burden of proof is unlikely to be met on a question 
of future harm rather than on a question of actual harm, commitment for 
dangerousness should also be abolished or used very sparingly when there 
truly is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People who prove themselves 
dangerous by way of a conviction for an actual crime should instead be able 
to voluntarily seek psychiatric treatment within the criminal justice system 
(possibly in hospital facilities segregated from other prisoners). Such a 
scheme would retain any possible benefits of civil commitment, including 
the availability of treatments that may be helpful even if the diagnoses 
associated with it are not scientifically valid. It would do so, however, 
without violating people’s civil rights through preventative detention with 
dubious rationale and insufficient due process. 
 
